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Every couple of decades the corporate social responsibility debate
heats up again.' While it is almost as old as the corporate form itself,
the debate took its modem form in the 1930s in an exchange between
Professors Adolf Berle and Merrick Dodd.2 Berle showed that own-
ership and control had separated in the modern publicly-held corpo-
ration.3 As he demonstrated, in most public corporations no one
shareholder or group of shareholders owns enough stock to control
the firm.4 Rather, such a firm is effectively controlled by the manag-
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1. "Corporate social responsibility" actually is a misnomer. A corporation is not a
moral actor: "Did you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has no
soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked?" PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS
398 (1960) (attributed to Edward, First Baron Thurlow). The corporate social responsi-
bility literature, however, frequently falls into the reification trap. Reification is use-
ful because it permits us to utilize a form of shorthand. It is easier to say "General
Motors ought to do so and so" than to describe the complex process that is actually
necessary for General Motors to do something. Indeed, it is very difficult to think
about large firms without reifying them. Reification, however, can be dangerous. Rei-
fication makes it easy to lose sight of the fact that firms do not do things; people do
things. The proper focus is thus not on the corporation's obligations, but on the moral
obligations and legal duties of the actors who make corporate decisions.
2. Compare Adolf Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV.
1049 (1931) and Adolf Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1365 (1932) with Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
HARV. L. REV. 11,45 (1932) and Merrick Dodd, Is Fffective Enforcement of the Fiduci-
ary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 194 (1935).
3. ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 119-25 (1933).
4. Id. at 84-89. Berle and Means also identified two other basic types of corpora-
tions: majority controlled firms, in which a dominant shareholder (or group of share-
ers who operate it. 5
Berle contended that, in light of this separation, the board of direc-
tors should operate the corporation for the sole benefit of the share-
holders. Berle, and his fellow advocates of this position, argued that
corporate concern for nonshareholder interests is appropriate only if
shareholder interests are thereby advanced.6 As Milton Friedman
once stated, "The social responsibility of business is to increase its
profits." 7 A fairly standard litany of supporting arguments evolved,
ranging from concerns over management accountability to claims
that a sole focus on maximizing shareholder wealth benefits all mem-
bers of society.8
Dodd generally accepted the separation of ownership and control
as describing public corporations, but rejected Berle's views on corpo-
rate social responsibility. Dodd, and his fellow proponents of this
side of the debate, saw shareholders as absentee owners whose inter-
holders acting together) owns more than 50% of the outstanding voting shares; and
minority controlled corporations, in which a dominant shareholder (or group of share-
holders acting together) owns less than 50% of the outstanding voting shares, but is
nevertheless able to exercise effective voting control. Id, at 70-84. Berle and Means
argued that these two types of firms show a partial separation of ownership and con-
trol; that is, the dominant shareholder controls the firm, leaving the minority share-
holders (who "own" part of the firm) without significant control power. Id.
5. All corporation codes reflect and perpetuate this separation. In each, the basic
corporate governance model is one in which the board of directors acts and the share-
holders react. In theory, the board of directors makes most corporate decisions. The
few decisions made by shareholders almost uniformly are cast as approving or re-
jecting a recommendation by the board of directors. Thus, shareholders have virtually
no power to initiate corporate action.
In most public corporations, of course, the vast majority of all decisions will be made
by officers and other corporate employees. In practice, the board often is simply a rub-
ber stamp for senior management. In theory, however, all corporate decisions are
either to be made by the board or pursuant to authority properly delegated by the
board. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Act § 8.01(b) (1984). Periodically a
board will exercise that power and override the wishes of senior management. In any
event, this article's focus on the board of directors can perhaps be justified as a useful
shorthand for the more complex decision-making system that exists in reality.
6. For simplicity's sake, this Article ignores the many and sometimes complex
distinctions that divide the members of each camp amongst themselves. For example,
Berle suggested that the time might come when managers would "develop into a
purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the com-
munity." BERLE & MEANS, supra note 3, at 356. Until that time, however, Berle
thought it better to treat directors as trustees for the shareholders. Id. at 355. For
some of Berle's followers, that time still has not come. For others, like Milton Fried-
man, a corporation's sole social responsibility always should be profit maximization.
See infra text accompanying note 7.
7. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Prof-
its, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, (Magazine) at 32.
8. In the interests of brevity, this Article does not attempt a full treatment of the
corporate social responsibility debate. For useful summaries, see KEITH DAVIS, THE
CASE FOR AND AGAINST BUSINESS ASSUMPTION OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES, IN MANAG-
ING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 35, 40-44 (Archie B. Carroll ed. 1977); Lyman
Johnson, Corporate Takeovers and Corporations: Who are They For?, 43 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 781, 789-98 (1986).
[Vol. 19: 971, 1992] Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
ests can be subjugated to those of other corporate constituencies and
those of society at large. Members of this camp thus define the "so-
cially responsible firm" as "one that becomes deeply involved in the
solution of society's major problems."9 Again, a fairly standard litany
of supporting arguments evolved, ranging from long-run shareholder
self-interest to the very viability of capitalism.' 0
In the wake of the 1980s' merger mania, the corporate social re-
sponsibility debate resurfaced, but in a slightly different guise. This
time, the controversy focuses on the corporation's responsibility to
so-called stakeholders, or nonshareholder corporate constituents,
such as employees, customers, suppliers, and local communities." On
one side are those who argue that corporate actions affect not only
shareholders, but also a variety of nonshareholder constituencies
having legitimate interests in the corporation's actions.12 On the
other side are those who still argue for the primacy of shareholder
interests. In a sense, it is the Dodd and Berle debate all over again.13
The resurgence of this debate coincided with what some regard as
the most significant change in United States corporate law since the
New Deal federal securities laws or even the enabling corporate
codes of the last century: the rise of nonshareholder constituency
statutes. These statutes explicitly permit directors to consider the ef-
fects of their decisions on a variety of nonshareholder interests. As
such, they are potentially revolutionary. United States corporate law
has generally come closer to Berle's position than to Dodd's, at least
in the sense of rhetorically requiring directors to act in the share-
9. ROBERT D. HAY & EDMUND R. GRAY, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF BUSINESS
MANAGERS, IN MANAGING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 8, 11 (Archie B. Carroll
ed. 1977).
10. See generally Davis, supra note 8, at 36-40.
11. The name "stakeholders" reportedly originated in a 1963 Stanford Research
Institute memorandum as a descriptive term for "those groups without whose support
the organization would cease to exist." Freeman & Redd, Stockholders and Stakehold-
ers: A New Perspective on Corporate Governance, 25 CAL. MGMT. REV. 88, 89 (1983).
12. The United States Catholic Bishops, for example, argue that employees, cus-
tomers, creditors, suppliers, and the communities in which the firm does business all
have a stake in the corporate enterprise and are entitled to have their interests consid-
ered in corporate decisionmaking. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECo-
NOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL: PASTORAL LETTER ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE
U.S. ECONOMY 145-52 (1986) [hereinafter BISHOPS' LETTER].
13. This debate over a corporation's responsibilities to stakeholders is not new. In
1929, Owen D. Young, an executive officer of General Electric, similarly argued that
not only shareholders, but also employees, customers, and the general public have an
interest in the corporation, which the firm's managers are obliged to protect. Address
of Owen D. Young (Jan. 1929), quoted in Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers
Trustees?, supra note 2, at 1154-55.
holders' best interests.14 Many observers, however, believe that the
nonshareholder constituency statutes either reject the primacy of
shareholder wealth maximization or at least may lead to such a
rejection. 15
Given their enormous potential for affecting corporate law, the
nonshareholder constituency statutes offer surprisingly little gui-
dance to directors faced with corporate decisions or to courts faced
with reviewing those decisions. Indeed, with very few exceptions, the
statutes do no more than authorize director consideration of non-
shareholder interests. Rarely is any legislative effort made to pro-
vide substantive or procedural standards for applying the statutes.
This Article proposes a model for interpreting nonshareholder con-
stituency statutes. The model strives to be consistent with both the
legislative intent underlying the statutes and the basic normative
precepts of corporate law. Part I briefly describes the legal landscape
as it existed before the nonshareholder constituency statutes (and, of
course, as it still exists in states without them). As Part I explains,
corporate law draws an important distinction between two basic
types of business decisions: (i) operational decisions, such as plant
closings; and (ii) structural decisions, such as takeovers. The former
generally receive much less probing review than do the latter.
Part II describes the statutes themselves and identifies the few
things that can be said with confidence about them. Part II also iden-
tifies the numerous critical issues the statutes leave unresolved.
Part III proposes a model that resolves the statutory ambiguities.
As with the pre-statutory common law, this model distinguishes op-
erational and structural decisions. In making operational decisions,
directors routinely consider nonshareholder interests. Part III argues
14. See infra Part I. Surprisingly, Berle himself believed that his argument with
Dodd "ha[d] been settled (at least for the time being) squarely in favor of Professor
Dodd's contention." ADOLF BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169
(1954). This concession appears to have been motivated in large part by the New
Jersey Supreme Court's decision in A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J.),
appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953), which upheld a state statute authorizing corpo-
rate charitable giving. See Berle, supra, at 158. In doing so, the court broadly endorsed
the corporate social responsibility doctrine. As described infra notes 43-47 and accom-
panying text, however, Barlow's result is not inconsistent with the profit maximization
theory and, in any event, it remains in the minority among the decided cases.
15. E.g., David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223, 277 (1991)
("these statutes raise fundamental normative questions about the appropriate aims of
corporate law and about corporate purpose itself."); Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructur-
ing the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect, 60
N.C.L. REV. 1189, 1260 (1991) ("the [nonshareholder constituency] statutes, in addition
to general fiduciary duty principles, could serve as a basis for expanding the directors'
fiduciary duties to employees in the context of fundamental corporate changes.");
James J. Hanks, Non-Stockholder Constituency Statutes: An Idea Whose Time Should
Never Have Come, 3 INSIGHTS 20, 25 (Dec. 1989) ("these statutes revolutionize corpora-
tion law").
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that this phenomenon should be neither surprising nor particularly
controversial. Accordingly, Part III suggests that courts should not
aggressively review operational decisions, but instead should gener-
ally defer to the directors' determination.
Structural decisions are more problematic. While stakeholder and
shareholder interests do not necessarily conflict in this context, con-
flict between management and shareholder interests is inherent in
all structural decisions. The law's dilemma is thus apparent. On the
one hand, the statutes permit directors to consider nonshareholder
interests. On the other, the statutes should not provide a cloak be-
hind which the behavior of self-interested directors may escape scru-
tiny. Part III concludes with a proposed legal regime that reconciles
these competing goals.
I. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
Analytical clarity requires a sharp distinction between two differ-
ent types of corporate decisions.16 Structural decisions relate to
changes in the ownership structure of the corporation. Operational
decisions encompass everything else-all of the decisions necessary to
run the firm on a continuing basis.
All corporation codes assign plenary authority over operational de-
cisions-the corporation's "business and affairs"-to the board of di-
rectors. 17 The board has similarly broad decision-making powers
with respect to negotiated acquisitions.18 Even in hostile tender of-
16. The word "decision" is used herein for semantic convenience to describe a pro-
cess that is much less discrete in practice. As Bayless Manning observes, most board of
director activity "does not consist of taking affirmative action on individual matters; it
is instead a continuing flow of supervisory process, punctuated only occasionally by a
discrete transactional decision." Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and
The Director's Duty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477, 1494 (1984).
17. See, e.g., Revised Model Business Corp. Act § 8.01(b) (1984).
18. Modern corporation statutes give considerable responsibility and latitude to
target directors in negotiating a merger agreement. Initially, the target's board pos-
sesses broad authority to determine whether to merge the firm and to select a merger
partner. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1101 (West 1990). The initial decision to enter
into a negotiated merger transaction is thus reserved to the board's collective business
judgment, with shareholders having no statutory power to initiate merger negotiations.
Jewel Cos., Inc. v. Pay Less Drugstores Northwest, Inc., 741 F.2d 1555, 1560 (9th Cir.
1984). The board also has sole power to negotiate the terms on which the merger will
take place and to arrive at a definitive merger agreement embodying its decisions as to
these matters. Id. at 1561. Shareholders have no statutory right to amend or veto spe-
cific provisions, their role being limited to approving or disapproving the merger agree-
ment as a whole, with most statutes only requiring approval by a majority of the
outstanding shares. See, e.g., Revised Model Business Corp. Act §§ 11.03(e), 12.02(e)
(1984).
fers, which theoretically permit the bidder to eliminate the need for
target management's cooperation by purchasing a controlling share
block directly from the stockholders, the target board's power to
erect takeover defenses and otherwise impede the bidder gives it con-
siderable influence over the outcome. Although the board thus has a
pervasive role in both the operational and structural contexts, United
States corporate law nevertheless treats these categories in quite dif-
ferent ways.
A. Operational Decisions
There is relatively little authority on the question of whether di-
rectors may consider nonshareholder interests in making operational
decisions. What authority does exist mainly relates to corporate phi-
lanthropy.19 Nonetheless, one thing can be said with considerable
confidence: shareholder challenges to operational decisions usually
fail.
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.20 exemplifies the courts' initial approach
to reviewing operational decisions. It also remains the classic state-
ment of the directors' duty to maximize shareholder wealth. In
Dodge, Henry Ford embarked on a plan of retaining earnings, lower-
ing prices, improving quality, and expanding production.2 ' According
to the plaintiff, an improper altruism towards his workers and cus-
tomers motivated Ford.22 The court agreed, rebuking Ford in a fa-
mous passage:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of
the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that
end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to
attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduc-
tion of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in or-
der to devote them to other purposes.
2 3
Thus, "it is not within the lawful powers of a board of directors to
shape and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the merely inciden-
19. In most states, the specific problem of corporate charitable giving has been
solved by the adoption of statutes authorizing corporations to make reasonable charita-
ble donations. See, e.g., Revised Model Business Corp. Act § 3.02(13) (1984); see gener-
ally Kenneth B. Davis, Discretion of Corporate Management to do Good at the Expense
of Shareholder Gain-A Survey of and Commentary on, the U.S. Corporate Law, 12
CAN.-U.S. L.J. 7 (1988). While corporate law codes are uniformly silent on the broader
question of a board of directors' power to generally consider ethical factors in making
operational decisions, the American Law Institute has proposed a rule permitting cor-
porations to devote reasonable amounts to charity and to otherwise take into account
ethical considerations reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of
the firm. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANAL-
YSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (Tentative Draft No. 11, 1991) [hereinafter ALI
PROJECT].
20. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
21. Id. at 683.
22. Id. at 683-84.
23. Id. at 684. See also Brinson Ry. Co. v. Exchange Bank, 85 S.E. 634 (Ga. 1915).
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tal benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefitting
others."24
The force of this extravagant pronouncement was immediately un-
dercut by the court's invocation of the business judgment rule,25
which provides a presumption that the corporation's directors acted
on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company.26 Unless the
plaintiff is able to rebut this presumption,27 the rule prohibits a court
from reviewing the board's decision.28 Advancing the rule's tradi-
tional justification, namely that judges are not business experts,29 the
Dodge court therefore declined to interfere with Ford's plans for ex-
pansion and dismissed the bulk of the plaintiff's complaint.3 0
As the law evolved, corporate altruism 31 began to be seen as proper
so long as it was likely to provide direct benefits to the corporation
and its shareholders.32 Moreover, applying the business judgment
24. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684.
25. Although the court did not use that term, both the holding and rationale of
Dodge are consistent with the modern doctrine. See id.
26. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985);
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646
F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Care
Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981); Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y.
1979).
27. The relationship between the business judgment rule and the duty of care is a
highly complex one. Most jurisdictions recognize that the business judgment rule only
protects an actual decision. In other words, while a decision not to act is protected, a
failure to decide is not. See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J.
1981). Second, most jurisdictions require that the board have used adequate proce-
dures in reaching its decision. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
Beyond this, various formulations have been used to describe the types of evidence
necessary to rebut the business judgment rule's presumptions. In general, however,
the rule will not protect a decision that is irrational or which is tainted by fraud, ille-
gality, or self-dealing. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1051 (1983); Kamin v. American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, affd, 387
N.Y.S.2d 993-94 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
28. The Delaware Supreme Court has recognized, but not adopted, a distinction
between the business judgment rule, which shields corporate officers and directors
from personal liability in connection with business decisions, and the business judg-
ment doctrine, which shields the decision itself from review. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAn-
drews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 n.10 (Del. 1986).
29. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684.
30. Id. The court did affirm a lower court order requiring Ford to resume paying
dividends. Id at 685.
31. The word "altruism" is used here to describe any decision motivated by consid-
erations other than shareholder wealth maximization. It thus includes, but also is
much broader than, corporate philanthropy.
32. See, e.g., Corning Glass Works v. Lucas, 37 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1929), cert. de-
rule, many courts essentially presumed that an altruistic decision was
in the corporation's best interests. The Illinois Court of Appeal's de-
cision in Shlensky v. Wrigley33 exemplifies this approach. In Schlen-
sky, a minority shareholder in the Chicago Cubs challenged the
majority shareholder's famous refusal to install lights at Wrigley
Field. Shlensky claimed the decision was motivated by Wrigley's be-
liefs that baseball was a day-time sport and that night baseball might
have a deteriorating effect on the neighborhood surrounding Wrigley
Field.34 During the relevant period, the Cubs consistently lost
money, which Shlensky claimed was attributable to their poor home
attendance, which in turn he claimed was attributable to the board's
refusal to install lights and play night baseball.35 According to Shlen-
sky, Wrigley was indifferent to the effect of his continued intransi-
gence on the team's finances.36 Shlensky argued that his complaint
thus stated a cause of action under Dodge.
Despite Shlensky's apparently uncontested evidence that Wrigley
was more concerned with stakeholder than with shareholder inter-
ests, the court did not require Wrigley to justify his decision.37 In-
stead, the court presumed that Wrigley's decision was in the firm's
best interests.38 Indeed, the court basically invented reasons why a
director might have made an honest decision against night baseball.
For example, the court stated that "the effect on the surrounding
neighborhood might well be considered by a director."39 Addition-
ally, the court said that "the long-run interest" of the firm "might de-
mand" protection of the neighborhood.40 Accordingly, Shlensky's
case was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted.4 1
The rhetorical emphasis shifted significantly between Dodge and
Shlensky. Where Dodge emphasized the directors' duty to maximize
profits, Shlensky emphasized the directors' authority and discretion.
Ultimately, however, they are consistent. The Illinois Appellate
nied, 281 U.S. 742 (1930); Virgil v. Virgil Practice Clavier Co., 68 N.Y.S.2d 335, 337
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1900); Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 40 N.Y.S.2d 718, 722 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1896).
33. 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). See also Ella M. Kelly & Wyndham, Inc. v.
Bell, 266 A.2d 878, 879 (Del. 1970); Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Trustees, Inc., 329 P.2d
398, 401-02 (Utah 1958).
34. Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 778.
35. Id.
36. Id.




41. Id. at 778-80. The court also stated that Shlensky's claim was defective for fail-
ing to show a causal link between the lack of night baseball and the firm's low profits.
Id. at 780-81. This passage is dictum, however, because the business judgment rule re-
quired the court to dismiss the complaint without reaching the merits.
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Court did not reject the profit-maximizing norm laid down by Dodge,
but rather followed Dodge in holding that the business judgment rule
immunized the directors' decision from judicial review.42
In contrast, some recent cases appear to posit that directors need
not treat shareholder wealth maximization as their sole guiding star.
A. P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow,43 the most frequently cited
example, upheld a corporate charitable donation on the ground, inter
alia, that "modern conditions require that corporations acknowledge
and discharge social as well as private responsibilities as members of
the communities within which they operate." 44 Ultimately, however,
the differences between Barlow and Dodge have little more than
symbolic import. As the Barlow court recognized, shareholders' long-
run interests are often served by decisions (such as charitable giving)
that appear harmful in the short-run.45 Because the court acknowl-
edged that the challenged contribution could be justified on profit-
maximizing grounds, its broader language on corporate social respon-
sibility is arguably mere dictum.46 In any case, Barlow and its ilk are
still in the minority.47
In sum, the law governing operational decisions has a somewhat
42. Shlensky cam be plausibly read in a variety of ways. This author reads it as
standing for two propositions: (1) corporate altruism is appropriate only if it is likely
to provide direct benefits to the corporation and its shareholders; but (2) applying the
business judgment rule, the court will essentially presume that the directors' decision
was in the corporation's best interests. In contrast, while Dean Clark acknowledges
that Shlensky can be read as standing "for the proposition that the business judgment
rule precludes a shareholder attack on the directors' business decisions on the ground
that the decisions were actually motivated by the directors' perceptions of social val-
ues," he argues that Shlensky is really "based on considerations of appropriate judicial
process." Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law 137 (1986). In his view, "courts should usu-
ally prohibit shareholders from attempting to prove management's real motivations in
this kind of case." Id. The end result, of course, is the same under either interpreta-
tion: Shlensky loses.
43. 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
44. Id. at 586. In Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch.
1969), the court similarly opined that corporate social responsibility was a desirable
goal. See id. at 404. The challenged corporate donation in question, however, was ulti-
mately upheld on the grounds that it produced long-term benefits for the stockholders.
See id. at 405. In contrast, one year later the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a chal-
lenged corporate gift based solely on the business judgment rule. Ella M. Kelly &
Wyndham, Inc. v. Bell, 266 A.2d 878, 879 (Del. 1970).
45. See Barlow, 98 A.2d at 586.
46. See CLARK, supra note 42, at 682 n.11.
47. See id. at 682 (stating that "[w]ith a possible exception or two, courts have not
retreated from the assumption that the primary or residual purpose of a business cor-
poration is to make profits for its shareholders"); Lyman Johnson, The Eventual Clash
Between Judicial and Legislative Notions of Target Management Conduct, 14 J. CORP.
L. 35, 43 (1988) (sane).
schizophrenic feel. In most jurisdictions, courts will exhort directors
to use their best efforts to maximize shareholder wealth.48 In a few
jurisdictions, courts may exhort directors to consider the corpora-
tion's social responsibility. In either case, however, the announced
principle is no more than an exhortation. The court may hold forth
on the primacy of shareholder interests, or may hold forth on the im-
portance of socially responsible conduct, but ultimately it does not
matter. Under either approach, directors who consider non-
shareholder interests in making corporate decisions, like directors
who do not, will be insulated from liability by the business judgment
rule.
B. Structural Decisions
Because courts analyze most aspects of negotiated acquisitions in a
manner similar to operational decisions,49 this Article's analysis of
structural decisions focuses mainly on a target board of director's re-
sponse to contested changes in ownership. The law governing a tar-
get board's conduct in a corporate control contest is most fully
developed in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.50 and its progeny.
In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court adopted a two-pronged stan-
dard for reviewing takeover defenses. The first prong requires the
directors to "show that they had reasonable grounds for believing
that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed."51
Among other things, this requires proof that they acted in good faith
and conducted a reasonable investigation.5 2 The second prong re-
quires a showing that the defensive measure was reasonable in rela-
tion to the threat posed by the hostile bid.53 The directors are
entitled to the business judgment rule's protections only if they carry
their burden of proof on both prongs. In contrast to operational deci-
48. Even in such jurisdictions, of course, the duty to maximize shareholder wealth
has always been subject to exceptions, most prominently the corporation's obligation
"to act within the boundaries set by law." ALI PROJECT, supra note 19, at § 2.01.
49. Most aspects of negotiated acquisitions--such as a board decision to approve or
reject a merger proposal--are reviewed under a business judgment rule analysis
closely akin to that applied to operational decisions. See, e.g., Paramount Communica-
tions, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1989); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
858 (Del. 1985). Some board decisions in connection with a negotiated acquisition, how-
ever, are reviewed under the two-pronged standard described below. The most impor-
tant of these is a board decision to grant a lock-up or exclusive merger agreement to
the bidder. See Time, 571 A.2d at 1151. The special problems of negotiated acquisitions
are discussed infra note 207.
50. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
51. Id. at 955. The Unocal standard is applied to a challenged takeover defense
not only when it is adopted, but also when it is utilized by the target in connection
with a particular tender offer. Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346,
1357 (Del. 1985).
52. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
53. Id. at 953-55.
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sions, structural decisions thus are carefully scrutinized to insure that
the board really is acting in the corporation's best interests.54
Unocal appeared to allow directors to consider interests other than
short-term shareholder wealth maximization. Under Unocal, target
directors may balance the takeover premium a bidder offers share-
holders against the bid's potential effects on the corporate entity.5 5
Among other factors, the board was explicitly permitted to consider
"the impact [of the bid] on 'constituencies' other than shareholders
(i.e., creditors:, customers, employees, and perhaps even the
community)." 56
Unfortunately, Unocal was not entirely clear as to what the lan-
guage just quoted meant. Unocal's board was faced with a structur-
ally coercive bid by "a corporate raider with a national reputation as
a 'greenmailer.' "57 Accordingly, the directors reasonably believed
that the bid was not in the best interests of any corporate constitu-
ency and, on the facts before the court, there arguably was no con-
flict between shareholder and stakeholder interests.
54. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 1986).
55. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. The court also spoke of the directors' duty of care as
running to both "the corporation and its owners," id., implying that those interests
might diverge.
56. Id. Several judicial opinions outside Delaware suggest that nonshareholder in-
terests may be considered in making structural decisions. See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v.
Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984); Herald Co. v. Sewell, 472 F.2d 1081
(10th Cir. 1972); GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Enterra Corp. v. SGS Associates, 600 F. Supp. 678 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Abramson v. Ny-
tronics, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). It is difficult to form a coherent picture
from these cases. Most courts outside of Delaware face corporate law issues on a spo-
radic basis, which precludes detailed doctrinal development. Cf Treadway Cos., Inc. v.
Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that "[t]he law in this area is some-
thing less than a seamless web").
57. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956. Structurally coercive takeover tactics are defined as
those creating a "risk that disparate treatment of non-tendering shareholders might
distort shareholders' tender decisions." Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Dela-
ware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Proportionality Review, 44 Bus.
LAW. 247, 267 (1989). Two-tier tender offers are perhaps the most commonly recog-
nized form of structural coercion. In a two-tier offer, the bidder announces a partial
tender offer and, at the same time, announces that if the offer succeeds it will be fol-
lowed by a back-end merger to freeze-out the remaining shareholders. The back-end
merger is typically at a lower price and/or in a different type of consideration, such as
junk bonds instead of cash. If shareholders believe that the offeror is likely to obtain a
controlling interest in the front-end transaction, they face the risk that they will be
squeezed out in the back-end for less desirable consideration. Thus they are coerced
into tendering into the front-end to avoid that risk, even if they believe the front-end
transaction itself is undesirable. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements
and Lock-Ups in Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 75 MINN. L. REV. 239, 313 n.315
(1990).
Other situations are not so clear-cut. Suppose, for example, the
bidder makes a fairly priced, non-coercive offer, but also announces
plans to close plants and lay off numerous workers. The target's
board of directors reasonably concludes that the negative impact on
its employees exceeds the gains shareholders will garner. Did Unocal
permit the board to turn down such an offer?5 8
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, Inc.,59 the
Delaware Supreme Court said Unocal did not. Revlon involved a
common takeover situation: an initial hostile bid, followed by a
friendly bid from a white knight solicited by target management, and
several subsequent rounds of bidding. The Delaware Supreme Court
held that once the target's directors decided to sell the company to
one of the bidders, their sole remaining responsibility was maximiz-
ing shareholder value.6 0 In the court's apt phrase, they became "auc-
tioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders."61
Revlon adds two crucial provisos to Unocal's treatment of non-
shareholder constituencies. The first is of general applicability, deal-
ing with all structural decisions except those in which the Revlon
auctioneering duties have triggered. If Unocal arguably allowed tar-
get boards to trade off a decrease in shareholder wealth for an in-
crease in stakeholder wealth, Revlon forecloses that interpretation.
Revlon expressly forbids management from protecting stakeholder
interests at the expense of shareholder interests.62 Rather, any man-
agement action benefitting stakeholders must produce ancillary
shareholder benefits.6 3 In other words, directors may only consider
58. In Newell Co. v. Vermont American Corp., 725 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ill. 1989),
the court, applying the Unocal test, determined that the offer would maximize short-
term shareholder profits, but nevertheless upheld the target's defensive measures.
Although the principal threat appeared to be to nonshareholder interests, the court
avoided the question posed in the text by finding that long-term shareholder interests
were threatened. See id, at 372-76. As to the notion that shareholders have long-term
interests in the takeover context, see irifra note 66.
59. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
60. Id. at 182.
61. Id, Determining whether the Revlon auctioneering duties have triggered is a
relatively complex question. See generally Bainbridge, supra note 57, at 301-17.
62. As described supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text, some courts have im-
posed a similar requirement of proportionality between stakeholder and shareholder
gains to operational decisions. Therefore, in a sense, this aspect of Revlon is not new.
Revlon's rule is more restrictive, however, because the business judgment rule does not
preclude courts from evaluating structural decisions. In contrast, nothing in Revlon af-
fects the business judgment rule's continued application to operational decisions.
63. "A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its respon-
sibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders."
Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955
(Del. 1985)). A somewhat weaker formulation was used in Mills Acquisition Co. v.
Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989), which allows consideration of non-
shareholder interests provided they bear "some reasonable relationship to general
shareholder interests." Id. at 1282 n.29.
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stakeholder interests if doing so would benefit shareholders.6 4
Second, if the Revlon auctioneering duty triggers, stakeholders be-
come entirely irrelevant. Once a Revlon auction begins, it no longer
matters whether benefitting nonshareholder interests may also bene-
fit shareholders. Instead, shareholder wealth maximization is the
board's only appropriate concern. 65 Indeed, in this context, consider-
ing any factors other than shareholder wealth violates the board's fi-
duciary duties.66
In sum, Revlon sharply limits directors' ability to consider non-
shareholder interests in structural decisions.67 Moreover, by with-
64. Compare Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209, 231-32 (S.D. Ohio),
affd, 815 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1987) (employee stock ownership plan invalidated because
there was "no evidence in the record as to how the ESOP would benefit the stockhold-
ers nor as to how Ropak's tender offer posed a threat to Buckhorn's employees") with
Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Co., 559 A.2d 257, 276 (Del. Ch. 1989) (employee
stock ownership plan upheld because it was "likely to add value to the company and
all of its stockholders").
65. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
66. Id. at 185. Accord Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard, Inc., 682 F.
Supp. 772, 786-87 (D. Del. 1988) (board actions protecting employees improper when
Revlon duties triggered); C-T of Virginia Inc. v. Barrett, 124 Bankr. 689, (board consid-
eration of creditor interests improper once Revlon duties triggered), argued on other
grounds, 124 Bankr. 694 (W.D. Va. 1990), affd on other grounds sub nom, C-T of Vir-
ginia, Inc. v. Euroshoe Assoc., No. 91-1578 (4th Cir. Jan. 29, 1992) (LEXIS, Genfed Li-
brary, CA4 File).
The American Law Institute proposes a rule pursuant to which the target's board
may "have regard for interests or groups (other than shareholders) with respect to
which the corporation has a legitimate concern if to do so would not significantly disfa-
vor the long-term interests of shareholders." ALI PROJECT, supra note 19, at
§ 6.02(b)(2). This rule apparently would apply to all takeover situations, including
those in which a control auction has begun. See id, at 540-41. This is a very odd formu-
lation. Even the ALI's reporter seems puzzled by it. See id. at 558-59. For one thing,
the shareholders have long-term interests in the takeover context only if the target
remains independent. The standard thus seems to put the cart before the horse. Addi-
tionally, how much injury to the shareholders can the target board work before the
shareholders are "significantly disfavor[ed]"? The ALI failed to coherently answer
that question. The unsatisfactory treatment of this issue by the ALI becomes more ex-
plicable when one realizes that Section 6.02 was one of the most hotly debated sections
of the ALI Project. The final version is a compromise that seems to have satisfied no
one. See Steven Wallman, Section 6.02: Is ALl Provision on Director Duties Consis-
tent with Evolution in Thinking about Takeovers?, Corp. Counsel Weekly (BNA) at 8
(Aug. 7, 1991).
67. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989), re-
treated from Unocal by broadening the types of threats to corporate policy that justify
a defensive response. Time also limited the circumstances in which the Revlon auc-
tioneering duty applies. Unfortunately, Time did not squarely address the role of
stakeholder interests under either Unocal or Revlon. See Bainbridge, supra note 57, at
306-17. But see Lyman Johnson & David Millon, The Case Beyond Time, 45 Bus. LAW.
2105 (1990) (Time implicitly allows target managers greater freedom to consider non-
shareholder interests); Millon, supra note 15, at 237-38 (same).
holding the business judgment rule's protections from directors,
Revlon puts considerable teeth into the shareholder wealth max-
imization norm. Unlike the operational context, directors who make
structural decisions based on stakeholder interests rather than share-
holder interests face the very real threat of personal liability.68
II. NONSHAREHOLDER CONSTITUENCY STATUTES
The takeover wave of the 1980s produced a host of target corpora-
tion defensive tactics. A variety of so-called shark repellents devel-
oped early on. These are charter or, less commonly, by-law
provisions designed to impede changes of control opposed by incum-
bent management.
So-called nonmonetary factor provisions are a relatively common
variant on the shark repellent theme.6 9 They permit, and in some
cases require, directors to consider a variety of nonprice factors in
evaluating a proposed acquisition. In particular, most allow directors
to consider "the social, legal and economic effects [of an offer] upon
employees, suppliers, customers and others having similar relation-
ships with the corporation, and the communities in which the corpo-
ration conducts its business."70
From management's perspective, nonmonetary factor provisions
have two principal drawbacks. First, except in the case of a newly
incorporated firm, they must be adopted as amendments to the cor-
poration's charter, which requires shareholder approval. Shareholder
resistance to shark repellents steadily grew throughout the 1980s, es-
pecially among institutional investors. In 1989, for example, over half
of the institutional investors responding to an industry survey re-
ported that they had opposed some nonmonetary factors provisions,
68. Delaware's director liability limitation statute permits corporations to adopt
charter provisions eliminating monetary liability for violations of the duty of care but
not for violations of the duty of loyalty. DEL. CODE ANN. GEN. CORP. LAW §§ 102(b)(7),
145 (1990); see generally Marc I. Steinberg, The Evisceration of the Duty of Care, 42
Sw. L.J. 919 (1988); Lynne A. Whited, Note, Corporate Directors-An Endangered Spe.
cies? A More Reasonable Standard for Director and Officer Liability in Illinois, 1987
U. ILL. L. REV. 495. Because takeover defenses implicate both duties, Mills Acquisition
Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1284 n.34 (Del. 1988), monetary liabilities should
remain available in this context. See Bainbridge, supra note 57, at 322 n.349.
69. As of 1989, over eighty corporations had adopted such provisions. American
Bar Association Section of Business Law Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Con-
stituencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 Bus. LAw. 2253, 2257 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter ABA Committee].
70. Proxy Statement and Text of Amendment for Nortek, Inc. (May 26, 1982), re-
printed in 1 SHARK REPELLENTS AND GOLDEN PARACHUTES: A HANDBOOK FOR THE
PRACTITIONER 198 (Robert L. Winter, Robert D. Rosenbaum, Mark H. Stumpf, and L.
Stevenson Parker eds., 1983 & Supp. 1989) [hereinafter SHARK REPELLENTS]. The full
laundry list also usually includes: the legality of the offer; the bidder's financial condi-
tion, prospects, and reputation; and the offer's structure and bidder's intentions for the
target. See id. at 194.
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while another one-quarter reported that they did so routinely.71 This
growing opposition may deter some firms from proposing
amendments. 72
Second, and more seriously, state law arguably does not permit cor-
porate organic documents to redefine the directors' fiduciary duties.
In general, a charter amendment may not derogate from common
law rules if doing so conflicts with some settled public policy. 73 In
light of the well-settled shareholder wealth maximization policy,
nonmonetary factors charter amendments therefore appear
vulnerable.74
These sort of problems are rarely allowed to stand in the way of a
good idea. In the unrelenting takeover arms race, legislative defenses
are especially important. Well over two-thirds of the states now have
takeover laws,,75 which in fact are almost uniformly better termed
anti-takeover laws. Typically, they are adopted at the behest of cor-
porate managers, many being emergency legislation designed to fend
off a pending takeover bid for an in-state company.76
Nonshareholder constituency statutes are one of the more common
variants on the state takeover law theme,77 with more than twenty-
five states now having some version of them.78 Usually they are
71. LAUREN KRASNOW, VOTING BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON CORPORATE Gov-
ERNANCE ISSUES IN THE 1989 PROXY SEASON 37 (1989).
72. While virtually all nonmonetary factor charter amendments still receive
shareholder approval, the average affirmative vote in 1989 was 68.1 percent of the
shares voted, which is quite low by corporate voting standards. Id
73. Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 118 (Del. 1952); ERNEST L.
FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW: A COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS
10 (1972).
74. Cf. ALl PROJECT, supra note 19, at 90-92 (unclear under current law whether
charter provisions derogating from the profit maximization norm are valid without
unanimous shareholder approval).
75. Investor Responsibility Research Center, State Takeover Laws 2 (1989).
76. Id
77. Early writing on these laws tended to refer to them as nonmonetary factor
statutes. E.g., 3 SHARK REPELLENTS, supra note 70, at 55. The nonshareholder constit-
uency name used herein, however, is currently the fashionable one. If nothing else,
the name change is useful in keeping the statutes separate from the comparable char-
ter provisions.
78. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202.A (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e)
(West 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830(3) (West 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-202(b)(5)
(Harrison 1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-35 (1990); IDAHO CODE § 30-1602 (1990); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.85 (Smith-Hurd 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1 (West
1990); IOWA CODE § 490.1108 (1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4) (Baldwin
1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 92(G) (West 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716
(West 1989); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 65 (Law. Co-op. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 302A.251 (West 1991); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30(d) (1990); Mo. ANN. STAT.
adopted as amendments to the existing statutory statement of the di-
rector's duty of due care.7 9 The basic model followed by most of the
statutes provides that in discharging their duty of care, directors may
consider the effects of a decision on not only shareholders, but also
on a list of other constituency groups.S0 With minor variations, the
list of permissible interests typically includes employees, suppliers,
customers, creditors, and the local communities in which the firm
does business.81 In addition to the laundry list of constituency fac-
tors, some statutes more generally authorize directors to consider
both the long- and short-term effects of the decision.82
A couple of things can be said with confidence about non-
shareholder constituency statutes. First, unlike many nonmonetary
factor charter provisions, most nonshareholder constituency statutes
are not limited to takeover decisions.83 As a result, the interests of
nonshareholder constituencies may be considered in all structural
and operational decisions.
§ 351.347 (Vernon 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2045(1)(c) (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:6-1 (West 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (Michie 1990); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 717(b) (Consol. 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Anderson 1990); OR.
REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (1990); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715-16 (Supp. 1991); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 7-5.2-8(a) (1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-33-4 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 48-35-204 (1988); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.0827 (West 1991); WYO. STAT. § 17-16-830
(1989). A proposed nonshareholder constituency amendment to the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act has been rejected. See ABA Committee, supra note 69, at
2253.
79. The Revised Model Business Corporation Act's phrasing of the duty of care is
typical:
"A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a
member of a committee: (1) in good faith; (2) with the care an ordinarily pru-
dent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interested of the
corporation."
Revised Model Business Corp. Act § 8.30(a) (1984).
80. 3 SHARK REPELLENTS, supra note 70, at 55.
81. Id,
82. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830(3) (West 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251
(West 1991). Arizona's statute omits the typical laundry list of nonshareholder constit-
uencies and instead merely authorizes directors to consider long-term effects of a deci-
sion. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202.A (1987).
A long-term effects provision is presumably intended to reaffirm that a board of di-
rectors may properly pass up short-term profits in order to pursue long-term gains.
Millon, supra note 15, at 243. Of course, the same is true under the common law. See
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) (stating
that "absent a limited set of circumstances, as defined under Revlon, a board of direc-
tors, while always required to act in an informed manner, is not under any per se duty
to maximize shareholder value in the short-term, even in the context of a takeover").
83. Only Connecticut, Iowa, Louisiana, Missouri, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Ten-
nessee limit their nonshareholder constituency statutes' effect to corporate acquisi-
tions. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West 1990); IOWA CODE § 490.1108
(1990); LA: REV. STAT. ANN. § 92(G) (West 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347 (Vernon
1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8(a) (1990); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 48-35-204 (1988).
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Second, most statutes are permissive.8 4 Directors "may," but need
not, take nonshareholder interests into account. There are no ex-
press constraints on the directors' discretion in deciding whether to
consider nonshareholder interests and, if they decide to do so, which
constituency groups' interests to consider.8 As a result, the statutes
should not be interpreted as creating new director fiduciary duties
running to nonshareholder constituencies and the latter should not
have standing under these statutes to seek judicial review of a direc-
tor's decision.8 6
84. Only Connecticut requires directors to consider both shareholder and non-
shareholder interests. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West 1990). A few
states require directors to consider shareholder interests, while being merely permis-
sive with respect to stakeholder interests. See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying
text (discussing various state formulations).
85. Had the legislatures desired to force management to consider specific non-
shareholder constituency interests, more direct tools were readily at hand. For exam-
ple, the legislature could have mandated worker ownership of firms. Alternatively,
the legislature could have mandated worker participation along the lines provided by
the European Community's system of co-determination. See generally MICHAEL P.
DOOLEY, EUROPEAN PROPOSALS FOR WORKER INFORMATION AND CODETERMINATION:
AN AMERICAN COMMENT, IN HARMONIZATION OF LAWS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
TIES: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, CONFLICTS OF LAWS, AND CORPORATION LAW (P. Herzog
ed. 1983). The legislatures' uniform failure to adopt either of these widely known op-
tions strengthens the argument that the statutes should be construed as being purely
discretionary.
86. Although most statutes are silent on this point, the New York and Penn-
sylvania statutes explicitly state that they create no duties towards any party. N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (Consol. 1991); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1721 (1991 Supp.). Some
commentators assert that the nonshareholder constituency statutes are, or should be,
enforceable by stakeholders; alternatively, some posit that the nonshareholder constit-
uency statutes create, or may lead to the creation of, management fiduciary duties to
the stakeholders. E.g., Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CORP.
L. 205, 265-313 (1988); Millon, supra note 15; William R. Newlin & Jay A. Gilmer, The
Pennsylvania Shareholder Protection Act: A New State Approach to Deflecting Corpo-
rate Takeover Bids, 40 Bus. LAW. 111, 114 (1984); O'Connor, supra note 15, at 1232; see
generally Marleen A. O'Connor, Introduction to the Symposium on Corporate Malaise
Stakeholder Statutes: Cause or Cure?, 21 STETSON L. REV. 3 (1991).
Whatever the policy merits of creating fiduciary duties running from the directors to
the stakeholders, it is difficult to find such a duty in the statutory language. Even a
leading proponent of creating fiduciary duties running to stakeholders has recognized
this point: "Becauise these statutes do not mandate that directors consider non-
shareholder interests, these [stakeholder] groups probably do not have standing to en-
force these statutes." O'Connor, supra note 15, at 1233-34. Given that the extrinsic
information about legislative intent suggests that the legislatures saw the statutes as
making only minor changes in the law, the legislative history likewise provides no ba-
sis for reading such a duty into the current statutes. See irnfra notes 100-103 and ac-
companying text. Finally, it is important to note that at common law the board of
directors has no duty to consider nonshareholder interests. E.g., Local 1330, United
Steel Workers v. U.S. Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980). Accordingly, judicial
creation of such a duty should require a clearer legislative statement and proposals for
Beyond this, most statutes are frustratingly silent on many key is-
sues: How should directors decide whether particular claimants fall
into one of the protected constituent categories, some of which, such
as customers and communities, are very amorphous? What weight
should directors assign to shareholder and nonshareholder interests?
What should directors do when those interests can not be reconciled?
What should directors do when the interests of various non-
shareholder constituencies conflict amongst themselves? What stan-
dards should courts use in reviewing a director's decision not to
consider nonshareholder interests? What standards of review apply
to director action claimed to be motivated by concern for non-
shareholder constituents? With two prominent exceptions, discussed
below,87 the statutes simply do not address these questions.88
Nor is there, as yet, any significant guidance from the courts. The
few decisions involving nonshareholder constituency statutes to date
have not squarely addressed these basic issues. Rather, the decisions
are usually limited to an observation that the statutes permit director
consideration of stakeholder interests.8 9 The nearest thing to an ac-
tual interpretation of one of these laws is a federal district court
opinion, stating that Wisconsin's nonshareholder constituency statute
"appears to have codified Revlon's holding that a board can consider
other constituencies in the context of a tender offer."90 If by this the
court interpreted the statute as codifying Revlon's requirement that
benefits given nonshareholders must also benefit shareholders, then
the statute has no effect on current law. Presumably, however, the
court did not intend such a reading, as it went on to hold that the
business judgment rule protected the board's conclusion that the
takeover bid threatened long-term interests of nonshareholder con-
stituents.91 The waters thus remain quite murky.
Plausible interpretations of nonshareholder constituency statutes
fall on a spectrum between two extremes. At one end of the spec-
stakeholder standing therefore seem more appropriately addressed to legislatures than
to courts seeking to interpret the existing laws.
87. See infra notes 106-110 and accompanying text (discussing Indiana and Penn-
sylvania statutes).
88. In fairness to the statutes' drafters, the model set forth in this Article fully
resolves only the last of the questions asked above. This limitation, however, was ef-
fectively imposed by the drafters, who left management with almost unbridled discre-
tion on a host of issues. As discussed in Part III, however, this discretion is not
particularly troubling, so long as management's potential conflict of interest is effec-
tively constrained.
89. See, e.g., Keyser v. Commonwealth Nat'l Fin. Corp., 675 F. Supp. 238, 265-66
(M.D. Pa. 1987); Baron v. Strawbridge & Clothier, 646 F. Supp. 690, 697 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
90. Amanda Acquisitions Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984, 1009
(E.D. Wis.), qffd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955
(1989).
91. Id. at 1012-13.
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trum is a reading that allows directors to ignore shareholder interests
in making corporate decisions. At the other end is a reading under
which the statutes simply codify the pre-existing common law, in-
cluding an unmodified shareholder wealth maximization norm. As I
indicate below, neither extreme is likely to emerge as the prevailing
interpretation.
At one end of the spectrum of possible interpretations of the stat-
utes is an interpretation permitting directors to disregard share-
holder interests in the face of a threat to nonshareholder
constituencies. For example, a board could refuse a takeover offer
carrying a substantial premium, and enforce that refusal through
takeover defenses, because of threats to nonshareholder interests.
That refusal, as well as the decision to consider nonshareholder inter-
ests in the first place, would be protected by the business judgment
rule.
Courts are unlikely to adopt this interpretation. For one thing, it is
inconsistent with the plain language of the statutes. No statute au-
thorizes directors to ignore shareholder interests. Instead, the stat-
utes merely authorize directors to consider a variety of additional
interests. The right to consider a wider variety of interests does not
equal a right to ignore the shareholders' interests. To the contrary,
most statutes either explicitly or implicitly oblige directors to con-
sider shareholder interests. Connecticut, Idaho, Mississippi, New
Mexico, Ohio, and Wyoming expressly require directors to consider
shareholder interests. In contrast, however, except for Connecticut,
those statutes are merely permissive with respect to stakeholders.92
A number of other states use a formulation providing that non-
shareholder interests may be considered "in addition to shareholder
interests" or making reference to the "best interests of the corpora-
tion and its shareholders." 93 At a minimum, these formulations rec-
92. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West 1990); IDAHO CODE § 30-1602 (1990);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 794-8.30(d) (1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (Michie 1990);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Anderson 1990); WyO. STAT. § 17-16-830 (1989).
93. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202.A (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830(3) (West
1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-202(b)(5) (Harrison 1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-35 (1990);
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1 (West 1990); IOWA CODE § 490.1108 (1990); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 271B.12-210(4) (Baldwin 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 92(G) (West 1991); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West 1989); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 65 (Law.
Co-op. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251 (West 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1
(West 1990); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (Consol. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5)
(1990); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715-16 (Supp. 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8(a) (1990);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § :80.0827 (West 1991). In the absence of some such formulation, of
course, a more tenable argument can be made for an interpretation permitting direc-
ognize the continuing importance of shareholder interests in
corporate decision-making.
Second, this interpretation would essentially eliminate all vestiges
of management accountability without any corresponding gains in,
for example, protection of nonshareholder constituents. If directors
are entitled to ignore shareholder interests, the directors' fiduciary
duties are rendered meaningless. No meaningful legal mechanism
would remain to hold managers accountable to shareholders. At the
same time, because the statutes create no fiduciary duties running to
nonshareholder constituencies and are not enforceable by them,94
management could not be held accountable by stakeholders. Accord-
ingly, this interpretation would result in unbridled management
discretion.
Similarly, and even more importantly, in light of the traditional
primacy of shareholder interests, this interpretation would amount to
a total rejection of corporate law's basic normative principle. Surely
the legislatures would have spoken more clearly had they intended
such a dramatic change in the law. 95 This is not to say that the stat-
utes codify shareholder wealth maximization as the sole, or even the
principal, guiding norm of corporate decision-making. To the con-
trary, the statutes do modify shareholder wealth's traditional position
at the top of the corporation's list of priorities.96 The point here is
only that, absent clearer legislative guidance, courts are unlikely to
read these vague statutes as rendering shareholders wholly
irrelevant.
At the other end of the spectrum of possible interpretations is the
view that the statutes merely codify the existing common law rules.97
tors to ignore, or at least subordinate, shareholder interests. In light of the strong tra-
dition of shareholder primacy, however, such an interpretation seems unlikely unless
the legislatures speak more clearly. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
95. The legislative history of these statutes suggests that most legislators thought
they did not significantly change current law. See inffra notes 100-103 and accompany-
ing text. But see Millon, supra note 15, at 277 ("It is conceivable that the directors'
duty statutes herald the beginnings of a radically different understanding of corporate
law and corporate purpose."); Newlin & Gilmer, supra note 86, at 123 n.53 (speculating
whether nonshareholder constituency statutes "will be seen as an historic shift from
corporate decisions being made on a purely economic basis to such decisions being
made after taking into account various community and other interests.").
96. See infra notes 100-110 and accompanying text. The Indiana and Pennsylvania
statutes are exceptional not only because they mandate review under the business
judgment rule, but also because they provide that a board need not consider share-
holder interests as taking precedence over stakeholder interests. But even these ex-
treme formulations do not go so far as to render shareholders wholly irrelevant. See
infra note 109 and accompanying text.
97. A leading proponent of this interpretation is the ABA Committee on Corpo-
rate Laws. ABA Committee, supra note 69, at 2263-68. The principal basis advanced
by the Committee for its position, however, is its desire to maintain the unchallenged
primacy of shareholder interests, id& at 2269, a goal the statutes reject. See infra notes
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Under this approach, the statutes have no new content and, in partic-
ular, do not affect the shareholder wealth maximization norm. If so,
courts properly could look to cases like Dodge and Revlon for gui-
dance in applying nonshareholder constituency statutes.98
This interpretation is even less likely to prevail than the preceding
one. If the statutes do nothing more than codify current law, with no
changes at all, why did the legislatures of well over half the states
bother adopting them?99 Presumably, the statutes do something
more than merely enshrine the status quo ante.
Admittedly, the legislative history in some states suggests that the
statutes were not seen as a dramatic departure from the common law
100-110 and accompanying text. The ABA Committee did advance one rather convo-
luted statutory interpretation argument for this interpretation. The committee noted
that many statutes use a formulation stating "that the directors in considering the best
interests of the corporation may take into account other constituencies." ABA Com-
mittee, supra note 69, at 2265 (emphasis omitted). The ABA Committee then equates
the corporation's best interests with corporate profit and shareholder gain. Id There
are many problems with this argument. First, the committee's description of the for-
mulation used by many states is incomplete. The typical formulation refers to the in-
terests of the corporation and its shareholders, which suggests that the corporation's
best interests and. the shareholders' best interests may be different. Second, their sole
authority for this approach is the American Law Institute's corporate governance pro-
ject. See ALI PROJECT, supra note 19. That project has been highly controversial. Fi-
nally, and perhaps most damningly, just one page after making the foregoing
argument, the ABA Committee acknowledges that legislatures normally "do not adopt
statutes that merely confirm the state of existing law." ABA Committee, supra note
69, at 2266. It is difficult to reconcile that statement with the Committee's claim that
the nonshareholder constituency statutes merely codify the pre-existing common law.
98. An eminent practitioner has noted an alternative interpretation pursuant to
which the statutes codify all of the pre-existing law, except for Revlon's restrictions on
consideration of stakeholder interests in the structural context. See James J. Hanks,
Playing with Firn: Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes in the 1990s, 21 STETSON L.
REV. 97, 107 (1991). See iykfra notes 100-115 and accompanying text (rejecting this in-
terpretation for different reasons).
99. True, some statutes are intended to codify existing law. Moreover, there is an
old canon of statutory construction pursuant to which "[n]o statute is to be construed
as altering the common law, farther than its words import. It is not to be construed as
making any innovation upon the common law which it does not fairly express." Shaw
v. Railroad Co., 101 U.S. 557, 565 (1879). On the other hand, "most statutes that affect
the common law are enacted for the very purpose of changing it." REED DICKERSON,
THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 206 (1975). In addition, "[w]hile
the canon strictly construing statutes in derogation of the common law has never been
repudiated, we believe it has generally become subordinate to the canon liberally con-
struing remedial statutes." WILLIAM ESKRIDGE & PHILLIP FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 656
(1988). Being remedial legislation designed to protect the interests of nonshareholder
corporate constituents, the statutes should be broadly construed to effect that goal. Fi-
nally, both the legislative context of the statutes and their plain language suggest that
they do something more than just codify the pre-existing common law. See infra notes
100-110 and accompanying text.
standards.100 One possible explanation for these statements is legis-
lative misunderstanding of the common law standards. As seen in
Part I, the common law in almost all states requires directors to max-
imize shareholder wealth. While that requirement has real teeth
only in the structural context, it applies to all corporate decisions. In
contrast, the legislative history frequently reflects a belief among the
statutes' supporters that the common law allows directors to make
trade-offs between shareholder and stakeholder interests. To the ex-
tent the common law allows such trade-offs, however, it does so only
because the business judgment rule shields most board decisions
from judicial review. Where the business judgment rule does not ap-
ply in full force, as in the structural context, such trade-offs are
sharply restricted.
In any case, the statutes' supporters were not principally concerned
with endorsing the pre-existing common law. The Ohio legislative
history, for example, states:
The Committee believes that Ohio law presently permits a director to take
into account interests other than those of shareholders; however, the Commit-
tee believes that it is desirable to specify and clarify the breadth of interests
which a director may consider. 10 1
This statement, like similar comments in other states,10 2 is princi-
pally a legislative endorsement of board power to protect stakeholder
interests. Thus, the controlling legislative intent is not a desire to
codify the existing common law, but rather a desire to ensure that di-
rectors can weigh nonshareholder interests in making corporate deci-
sions. To the extent that the common law rules limit the board's
power in that respect, as Revlon, for example, clearly does, the stat-
utes should be seen as derogating from the common law.103 There-
100. In supporting the Pennsylvania nonshareholder constituency statute adopted
in 1990, for example, several Pennsylvania legislators argued that the law would not
eliminate the rights of shareholders or fundamentally change the fiduciary duties of
corporate directors. See, e.g., Pa. Legis. J., House, Apr. 3, 1990, at 548 (Rep. Bortner);
id at 779 (Rep. Bortner); Pa. Legis. J., Sen., Dec. 12, 1989, at 1508 (Sen. Williams).
Similar views had been expressed in 1983 by the drafters of Pennsylvania's original
nonshareholder constituency statute. See Charles J. Dangelo, Comment, Community
Effects'as a Factor in Corporate Decisions under Pennsylvania's New Business Corpo-
ration Law: Objective Evidence of a Subjective Process, 28 DuQ. L. REV. 533, 536
(1990).
101. Addendum to Report of the Corporation Law Committee, Ohio State Bar
Ass'n Rep. 540 (1984), quoted in Charles Hansen, Other Constituency Statutes: A
Search for Perspective, 46 Bus. LAw. 1355, 1357 (1991).
102. The legislative history in Pennsylvania and Maine, for example, includes simi-
lar statements. See Hansen, supra note 101, at 1357-58. The legislative history in New
York goes even further, explicitly qualifying the shareholder wealth maximization
norm. See Hanks, supra note 98, at 107.
103. This interpretation is supported by the legislative history in those states where
the drafters viewed the common law more realistically. As the Florida legislature rec-
ognized, for example, "under present law there remains a potential for objection to a
director's consideration of factors that are not directly related to the corporation's in-
terest only." Florida State Committee on Commerce, Senate Staff Analysis and Eco-
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fore, courts Should not treat the statutes as codifying Dodge and
Revlon, but rather as allowing directors greater freedom to reallocate
gains and losses amongst the corporation's various constituencies.
The argument that the statutes simply codify the pre-existing com-
mon law is also undercut by the context in which they were adopted.
Like most state takeover laws, nonshareholder constituency statutes
are typically adopted at the request of target corporation manage-
ment actively engaged in resisting a hostile takeover bid. Unques-
tionably, the legislative intent was to make takeovers harder.104
What better way do so than by tempering the shareholder wealth
norm exemplified by Revlon? 0 5 This interpretation is especially apt
for those statutes that expressly permit directors to consider the cor-
poration's long-term interests even in takeover contests. These stat-
utes can only be read as implicitly rejecting Revlon's command that
short-term shareholder wealth maximization be the director's sole
concern once a corporate control auction begins.
The rejection of Revlon implicit in most statutes is made explicit
by Indiana's nonshareholder constituency statute, the first statute to
squarely face this problem. The legislation was obviously drafted in
response to a pair of Seventh Circuit decisions striking down a series
of poison pills adopted by a target corporation.106 Because Indiana
nomic Impact Statement on SB 0864, 2 (Apr. 28, 1989), quoted in Hansen, supra note
101, at 1358.
104. In a legislative debate on Pennsylvania's latest package of takeover laws,
which included a new nonshareholder constituency statute, one of the bill's sponsors
observed, "To Sam Belzberg, to Carl Icahn, to Boone Pickens, to the Bass Brothers, to
Don Trump and all you other corporate raiders, you do not have a friend in Penn-
sylvania." Pa. Legis. J., Sen., Dec. 13, 1989, at 1539 (Sen. Armstrong). See also id at
1507 ("legislation in defense from corporate raiders is no vice") (Sen. Williams); Pa.
Legis. J. House, Apr. 24, 1990, at 778 ("By passing this antitakeover measure, we will
send a loud and clear message to those who would make our Pennsylvania corpora-
tions simple, quick-profit chop shops, and that is, Pennsylvania is no longer your
playground.").
105. Professor. Johnson and Millon have argued that state takeover laws are gen-
erally intended "to protect nonshareholders from the disruptive impact of ... hostile
takeovers." Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover
Statutes, 87 MICH. L. REV. 846, 848 (1989) (emphasis in original). Whether or not this
claim is true of state takeover laws generally, it is difficult to reject as to non-
shareholder constituency statutes. See ROBERT D. ROSENBAUM & L. STEVENSON
PARKER, THE PENNSYLVANIA TAKEOVER ACT OF 1990: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 28-30
(1990) ("The basic argument made in support of the new [Pennsylvania] stakeholder
provision was that public corporations are and should be more than vehicles to gener-
ate maximum profits-particularly in the short term-for shareholders.").
106. Dynamics Corp. v. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1986), prior op., 794 F.2d
250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987). This takeover battle
went on to fame as CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69 (1987), in which the
had no applicable precedents, the Seventh Circuit looked to Unocal
and Revlon for guidance. Specifically, the court followed Revlon by
requiring that a target board's takeover decisions promote "the goal
of stockholder wealth maximization.' 0 7  The Indiana non-
shareholder constituency statute was specifically intended to reverse
that approach, giving courts astonishingly blunt guidance:
Certain judicial decisions in Delaware and other jurisdictions, which might
otherwise be looked to for guidance in interpreting Indiana corporate law, in-
cluding decisions relating to potential change of control transactions that im-
pose a different or higher degree of scrutiny on actions taken by directors in
response to a proposed acquisition of control of the corporation, are inconsis-
tent with the proper application of the business judgment rule under this
article.1
0 8
Revlon is the statute's clear target, for it goes on to expressly reject
the primacy of shareholder interests: "directors are not required to
consider the effects of a proposed corporate action on any particular
corporate constituent group or interest as a dominant or controlling
factor."1o9 Moreover, the board's determinations in this respect are
conclusive unless a challenger proves that the board did not act "in
good faith after reasonable investigation."110
In sum, neither of the foregoing extremes is likely to gain wide-
spread acceptance. Rather, the correct interpretation lies somewhere
in the middle. But where?
At a minimum, if the statutes do anything beyond merely codifying
present law, they presumably permit directors to select a plan that is
second-best from the shareholders' perspective, but which alleviates
the decision's impact on the firm's nonshareholder constituencies.1 1 '
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a different Indiana takeover statute.
No decision to date has squarely addressed the constitutionality of nonshareholder
constituency statutes. In the course of upholding a different type of state takeover
statute, however, Judge Easterbrook offered the following noteworthy dictum: "States
could choose to protect 'constituencies' other than stockholders." Amanda Acquisition
Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 500 n.5 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
955 (1989).
107. Dynamics, 794 F.2d at 256.
108. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(f) (West 1990).
109. Id.
110. Id. § 23-1-35-1(g). Pennsylvania's new nonshareholder constituency statute
largely tracks the Indiana statute. Like the Indiana law, Pennsylvania's makes the
board's determinations conclusive unless a challenger proves that the board did not act
"in good faith after reasonable investigation." 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1721 (Supp. 1991).
Similarly, Pennsylvania also precludes courts from imposing any burden greater than
the business judgment rule on directors seeking to justify takeover defenses. Id. Fi-
nally, the Pennsylvania statute does not require directors to treat any corporate con-
stituency interest as having paramount importance. See id. Although Pennsylvania
omitted any direct reference to Delaware law, the prohibition on imposition of a
higher standard of review is clearly intended to follow Indiana in precluding courts
from adopting Unocal or Revlon.
111. Cf. Hanks, supra note 15, at 21 (stating that "the real purpose of non-stock-
holder constituency statutes must be to enable directors to provide benefits to non-
stockholder groups even when doing so would not benefit the stockholders."); Millon,
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In other words, the directors may balance a decision's effects on
shareholders against its effect on stakeholders. If the decision would
harm stakeholders, the directors may trade-off a reduction in share-
holder gains for enhanced stakeholder welfare.
This interpretation is virtually compelled by the statutory lan-
guage. What purpose is there in giving the directors the right to con-
sider nonshareholder interests if the directors cannot protect those
interests? Without the right to act on their deliberations, the right to
include stakeholder interests in those deliberations is rendered nuga-
tory. If the statutes are to have any meaning, they must permit di-
rectors to make some trade-offs between their various constituencies.
Recognizing that the nonshareholder constituency statutes author-
ize such trade-offs, however, does not answer the question of how
courts should review the directors' decision. One possible answer is
suggested by the Indiana statute. Courts might simply apply the
business judgment rule to all decisions, both operational and
structural.
The business judgment rule, however, is an inappropriate standard
for situations implicating the directors' duty of loyalty. Constraining
corporate directors and officers from pursuing their own self-interest
at the expense of the firm's interest has long been one of corporate
law's central purposes. Indeed, one is hard pressed to find more
forceful judicial rhetoric than that used in self-dealing cases:
While technically not trustees, [officers and directors] stand in a fiduciary re-
lation to the corporation and its stockholders. A public policy, existing
through the years, and derived from a profound knowledge of human charac-
teristics and motives, has established a rule that demands of a corporate of-
ficer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous
observance of his duty .... The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish
loyalty to the corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between
duty and self-interest.1 1 2
Courts (and most legislatures too) have thus consistently refused to
extend the business judgment rule to situations where self-dealing is
likely. Rather, in such situations, directors are held to a very high
standard. A director charged with usurping a corporate opportunity,
for example, must "show that his every act.., was in the exercise of
supra note 15, at 266 (the statutes "should be read as an effort to deny shareholders
the power to realize short-term profits at the expense of management's discretion to
pursue longer-term strategies from which both shareholders and nonshareholders
might benefit."); Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 STETSON L.
REV. 121, 137-38 (1991) (statutes permit directors to pursue a "dual goal" of maximizing
shareholder gains, while minimizing stakeholder losses).
112. Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939).
the utmost good faith" towards the corporation.1 l3 In interested di-
rector transactions, absent an effective ratification by the disinter-
ested directors or the shareholders, the interested director must show
that the transaction is fair to the corporation.1i 4
Nonshareholder constituency statutes obviously are intended to
permit consideration of stakeholder interests, and, at the same time
make hostile takeovers more difficult. Moreover, it is clear that the
corporate managers who supported these statutes expected them to
help protect incumbent target management. But theirs is not the
controlling intent. There is no support in the legislative history for
the proposition that the legislatures intended to reject corporate
law's long-standing concern with preventing selfish director conduct;
nor is there any basis for claiming that the legislatures wished for
such conduct to go unreviewed.115 Courts outside of Indiana and
Pennsylvania should therefore be free to develop an interpretation
that allows directors to consider nonshareholder interests, but also
meaningfully constrains self-interested director behavior.
III. A CONFLICT OF INTEREST INTERPRETATION OF
NONSHAREHOLDER CONSTITUENCY STATUTES
Absent explicit legislative direction, such as that provided by the
Indiana statute, judicial interpretations of the nonshareholder con-
stituency statutes should focus on the likelihood that directors are
using the statutes as a cloak for their own self-interest. Where the
likelihood of self-dealing is low, the business judgment rule provides
an appropriate standard. But where it is likely that directors will act
in their own interest, rather than those of shareholders or stakehold-
113. I& at 512.
114. Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 739-41 (7th Cir. 1979).
115. Cf Millon, supra note 15, at 251 (stating that nonshareholder constituency
statutes do not preclude shareholder litigation based on management conflict of inter-
ests). In the 1983 legislative debate over Pennsylvania's original nonshareholder con-
stituency statute, one state senator objected that the proposed statute "could protect
poor management rather than benefitting shareholders." Dangelo, supra note 100, at
536. The bill's principal sponsor retorted that the statute "was meant to benefit share-
holders as well as the members of the enumerated classes" of stakeholders. Id. A stu-
dent commentator summarized the legislative intent by arguing that the Pennsylvania
statute's drafters intended "to benefit shareholders as well as the other corporate con-
stituencies," not "to protect poor corporate management." Id,
Consider also that in most nonshareholder contituency statutes corporate officers
are the one group conspicuously absent from the laundry list of nonshareholder inter-
ests a board may properly consider. To some extent, of course, corporate officers may
be subsumed within the broader employee category. That corporate officers were not
broken out as a separate category undoubtedly reflects on a political decision by the
drafters to focus on the interests of rank and file workers. Having done so, however,
they surely can not be heard to object if courts review board decisions to insure that it
is in fact the rank and file workers who will benefit from the decision and not senior
management alone.
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ers, a higher standard will be necessary.116
A. Operational Decisions and Nonshareholder Interests
Assume the XYZ Company operates a manufacturing plant near-
ing obsolescence in an economically depressed area. XYZ's board of
directors is considering three plans for the plant's future. Plan A
will keep the plant open, which will preserve the jobs of two hundred
fifty workers, but will reduce earnings per share by ten percent as
long as the plant remains open. Plan B will close the plant immedi-
ately, which will put the two hundred fifty plant employees out of
work in an area where manufacturing jobs are scarce, but will cause
earnings per share to rise by ten percent. Plan C contemplates clos-
ing the plant, but implementing a job training and relocation pro-
gram for its workers as a supplement to state-provided programs.
Plan C will cause a ten percent reduction in earnings per share for
one year.
A shareholder threatens to bring a derivative action against the di-
rectors charging breach of their duty of care if they pick any plan
other than Plan B. Under traditional corporate law principles, XYZ's
board is required to choose the plan that maximizes shareholder
wealth: Plan B.117 However, because the statutes permit directors to
balance shareholder and stakeholder interests, the board should be
116. For purposes of developing the arguments in this section, it is assumed that
the interests of all nonshareholder constituencies converge. In the real world, of
course, that assumption is unlikely to hold true. To take but one example, consider a
plant closing occasioned by shifting production from the high labor cost environment
of the United States to a lower labor cost site in a developing country. The firm's
United States workers and the local community are injured, but the developing coun-
try is benefited, customers will have lower product costs, and creditors may be more
secure. The probability of these sorts of divergences at least justifies, if it does not ex-
plain, the legislative decision to give management broad discretion. In any event, it
strains credulity to interpret the statutes as contemplating any restrictions on manage-
ment's discretion in this regard. Accordingly, the model proposed in this Article fol-
lows the clear legislative guidance by giving management full discretion in deciding
which stakeholder interests to consider and in deciding how to balance those interests
when they conflict. Under this approach to interpreting the statutes, this essentially
unbridled management discretion is not particularly troubling. As long as manage-
ment is precluded from preferring their own interests, management's evaluation of the
competing interests affected by a proposed corporate action is no different than any
other business decision they make.
117. See supra notes 20-42 and accompanying text. Under the ALI's proposed for-
mulation, the board would be obliged to close the plant, but would be permitted to
"make reasonable provision to cushion the transition of long-term employees who are
about to be discharged." ALI PROJECT, supra note 19, at 84.
free to adopt either Plan A or Plan C without fear of liability if a
shareholder challenges the board's decision.
As a practical matter, however, the result would be no different
under traditional common law rules. The business judgment rule un-
doubtedly would preclude judicial review of the board's decision.
Wrigley's stubborn opposition to lights probably cost the sharehold-
ers money over the short term, but the business judgment rule pre-
vented Shlensky's lawsuit from even coming up to bat.118 The same
was true with respect to Ford's concern for his workers and custom-
ers.119 Just so, the business judgment rule would shield XYZ's deci-
sion from judicial review. In theory, of course, absent a
nonshareholder constituency statute, a shareholder might be able to
rebut the business judgment rule's presumption of good faith and
hold directors liable for considering nonshareholder interests.120 In
practice, however, cases in which the business judgment rule does not
shield operational decisions from judicial review are so rare as to
amount to little more than aberrations. Therefore, the defendant
board normally will prevail regardless of whether the state has a
nonshareholder constituency statute. In sum, the probability of hold-
ing directors liable for operational decisions was so low before non-
118. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text (discussing Shlensky v. Wrigley,
237 N.E. 2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968)).
119. See supra notes 20-30 and accompanying text (discussing Dodge v. Ford Motor
Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919)).
120. The rules governing derivative suits will normally keep things from getting
that far. Suppose that the board of directors made a decision based on stakeholder,
rather than shareholder, interests. A shareholder sues (necessarily derivatively) for
breach of fiduciary duty. If the case is brought under New York law, demand will be
excused on the grounds that a majority of the board participated in the challenged
wrongdoing. See Barr v. Wackman, 329 N.E.2d 180 (N.Y. 1975). The defendant board
will thereupon appoint a special litigation committee. To no one's surprise, the com-
mittee will recommend dismissal. See James D. Cox, Searching for the Corporation's
Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982
DUKE L.J. 959, 963 (out of 20 special litigation cases, the committee recommended liti-
gation in only one instance). So long as the committee was independent and used ade-
quate procedures, the court will defer to its recommendation and the case will be
dismissed. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979).
Under Delaware law, the other leading standard in this context, demand will be re-
quired unless the plaintiff alleges specific facts creating a reasonable doubt that: (1) a
majority of the directors are (a) disinterested, and (b) independent; or (2) the chal-
lenged transaction was a valid business judgment. See Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180,
186 (Del. 1988). In other words, it is not enough to allege that the directors approved
the challenged transaction. Rather, the plaintiff must allege an improper motive or
conflict of interest affecting a majority of the board or allege facts showing the trans-
action to be so egregious on its face that it cannot be regarded as a valid business deci-
sion. See Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 205-06 (Del. 1991). This is a very difficult
standard to meet and, in most cases, demand will therefore be required. If demand is
required, the board will probably refuse demand. If so, its refusal will be reviewed
under the business judgment rule. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784
n.10 (Del. 1981). In all probability, the board's decision to terminate the litigation will
therefore be upheld.
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shareholder constituency statutes came along that the statutes could
not further lower it.121
This result is tolerable because most operational decisions do not
pose much of a conflict between the interests of directors, sharehold-
ers, and stakeholders. Granting, for example, that Ford and Wrigley
appear to have preferred their stakeholders' interests to those of
their shareholders, what selfish interests were Ford and Wrigley ad-
vancing? They probably were simply trying to comply with what
they saw as appropriate business ethics. At most, perhaps they
reaped psychological benefits from implementing their paternalistic
attitudes towards stakeholders.
Even assuming arguendo that these sort of psychological benefits
implicate the kinds of duty of loyalty concerns that justify setting
aside the business judgment rule, it is not clear that Ford's or Wrig-
ley's "self-interest" conflicted with the interests of their sharehold-
ers. With their theoretically perpetual duration, corporations must
plan for the long term.122 Considering a decision's impact on non-
shareholder constituencies may sometimes produce short-term share-
holder losses, but still ultimately prove to be in the shareholders'
best long-term interests.123
It is possible, for example, to construct a plausible argument that
Wrigley's opposition to lights was in the shareholders' best long-term
interest. Drunken fans reveling in the darkness might have had a
deleterious effect on the neighborhood. If so, attendance might de-
cline as the neighborhood declined.124
121. Moreover, many states have now adopted director liability statutes that limit a
board of directors' exposure to monetary damages for violations of the duty of care.
See supra note 68. This development virtually precludes director liability in the opera-
tional context, absent self-dealing or other unusual circumstances.
122. Accordingly, directors may pursue plans that are in the corporation's "best in-
terests without regard to a fixed investment horizon." Paramount Comm., Inc. v. Time
Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989).
123. In re TW Services, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334 (Del. Ch. 1989); ALI PROJECT, supra note 19, at 68; Wil-
liam J. Carney, Does Defining Constituencies Matter?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 385, 421-22
(1990); Lyman Johnson, The Eventual Clash Between Judicial and Legislative Notions
of Target Management Conduct, 14 J. CORP. L. 35, 43 (1988).
124. Noting that "the effect [of night baseball] on the surrounding neighborhood
might well be considered by a director," the court said "the long.run interest" of the
firm "might demand" efforts to preserve the local community from those effects.
Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. 1968). See also In re Reading Co.,
711 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1983) (corporate pricing and dividend policies that failed to maxi-
mize short-term profits nevertheless could rationally be seen as in corporation's long-
term interest).
Equally plausible arguments can be made for most corporate deci-
sions, including Ford's and the hypothetical XYZ board's. Both situa-
tions unquestionably involve short-term shareholder losses. Ford
Motor Company was selling all the cars it produced, so any reduction
in prices necessarily reduced profits. XYZ's Plan C requires the cor-
poration to expend funds on former employees, for example, which is
stipulated to result in a substantial one year reduction in earnings.
In both cases, however, the plan should generate favorable publicity.
Employee morale should improve with commensurate gains in pro-
ductivity.125 A variety of other benefits might be reaped. The short-
term earnings hit thus should pay long-term benefits.
The classic example of this phenomenon is corporate charitable
giving. General Motors ("GM") shareholders get no direct monetary
benefit when GM funds Public Broadcasting Station ("PBS") pro-
grams; moreover, the shareholders have no voice in which programs
GM funds. As the theory goes, however, charitable giving produces
good will and favorable publicity. In effect, charitable giving is sim-
ply another form of advertising.126 As such, it ultimately results in
more business and higher profits. 2 7
Board concern with stakeholder interests thus need not be incon-
sistent with its traditional duty to maximize shareholder wealth.
Over a very broad spectrum of corporate actions, a decision that ben-
efits stakeholders is likely to benefit shareholders as well. The fact
that the directors feel good about themselves for having made such a
decision hardly seems like the kind of self-dealing that justifies
heightened judicial scrutiny.
In the operational context, moreover, directors are subject to a va-
riety of extra-judicial constraints, which give directors strong incen-
tives to ensure that a board decision to benefit stakeholders will also
redound to the shareholders' benefit, thus eliminating the need for
exacting judicial review. Operational decisions are a species of what
economists refer to as repeat transactions. Where parties expect to
have repeated transactions, the risk of self-dealing by one party is
constrained by the threat that the other party will punish the cheat-
125. Cf PETER F. DRUCKER, CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION 182, 182-91 (rev. ed.
1972) (worker productivity enhanced when employees given opportunities for flexibil-
ity and creativity); Lewis D. Solomon, Humanistic Economics: A New Model for the
Corporate Constituency Debate, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 321, 342-46 (1990) (worker participa-
tion in corporate decision-making makes workers more productive).
126. The most persuasive objection to this argument is the oft-made observation
that the charities supported by most corporations tend to be rich people's charities:
art, music, public television, and the like. One can question how big a bang a company
gets for its advertising buck in giving to those charities. However, this is an implemen-
tation problem, which can be fixed. It is not a flaw in the basic theory.
127. For critiques of this argument, see Davis, supra note 19, at 11-19; Lyman John-
son, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law,
68 TEx. L. REV. 865, 901-02 (1990).
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ing party in future transactions. Just so, in the operational context,
self-interested management is subject to shareholder discipline. In-
deed, the system biases directors to favor shareholders: directors are
elected by shareholders, not stakeholders;128 management compensa-
tion is often linked to stock performance; and directors owe fiduciary
duties to shareholders, not stakeholders. The markets for corporate
control and managerial services, in addition to a variety of other ex-
tra-judicial forces, also constrain management's ability to structure
corporate transactions for its own benefit.129 As a result, even
though one suspects that directors routinely consider a decision's ef-
fect on nonshareholder constituents, boards of directors rarely make
operational decisions demonstrably contrary to shareholder
interests.13 0
True, these constraining forces do not eliminate the possibility of
director error. The directors may still be wrong in concluding that a
given decision benefits both shareholders and stakeholders. How-
ever, that is precisely the sort of error that the courts traditionally
eschew reviewing. Accordingly, in applying nonshareholder constitu-
ency statutes to challenged operational decisions, courts should con-
tinue to review those decisions under the business judgment rule.
In sum, despite the considerable hand-wringing the statutes have
generated, the nonshareholder constituency statutes' effect on review
of operational decisions actually is quite limited.'13 Granted, the stat-
128. While shareholders voting directors out of office traditionally has been re-
garded as merely a theoretical possibility, the growing importance of institutional in-
vestors and various related developments is helping to make it more of a reality. See
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Redirecting State Takeover Laws at Proxy Contests, 1992 Wis.
L. REV. (forthcoming); Bernard S. Black, SHAREHOLDER PAssIvITY REEXAMINED, 89
MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990); A.A. Sommer, Jr., Corporate Governance in the Nineties:
Managers v. Institutions, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 357 (1990).
129. Carney, supra note 123, at 422. See generally Ronald A. Gilson, A Structural
Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33
STAN. L. REV. 819, 836-40 (1981); Millon, supra note 15, at 261-63.
130. The ALI posits that "corporate decisions are not infrequently made on the ba-
sis of ethical considerations even when doing so would not enhance corporate profit or
shareholder gain. Such behavior is not only appropriate, but desirable." ALI PROJECT,
supra note 19, at 76. But, as a leading corporate law practitioner observes: "You're
never going to see a set of board meeting minutes that say the directors have wittingly,
knowingly and deliberately placed the interests of the employees or the community
ahead of shareholders." Panel Discussion, 59 U. CINN. L. REV. 467, 474 (1990) (state-
ment of A.A. Sommer, Jr.).
131. If this model is adopted, the legislative statements that the statutes would not
change the pre-existing common law begin to make sense. Because the business judg-
ment rule governed both at common law and under the statutes, the rhetorical
changes worked by the statutes are essentially unimportant. The important question
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utes modify the common law's rhetorical command to maximize
shareholder wealth. Because the business judgment rule will con-
tinue to shield operational decisions from review, however, just as it
did at common law, one might argue that the statutes do no more
than to bring the law's rhetoric into line with its reality.132
B. Structural Decisions and Nonshareholder Interests
The preceding analysis of operational decisions rests on two basic
assumptions: (1) stakeholder and shareholder interests normally co-
incide; and (2) directors are capable of objectively evaluating those
interests. While neither of these assumptions necessarily holds true
in structural decisionmaking, the latter is especially dubious in this
context.
1. The Impact of Structural Decisions on the Major Corporate
Constituents
The fundamental assumption underlying nonshareholder constitu-
ency statutes is that stakeholders, especially employees, are signifi-
cantly worse off because of corporate takeovers.133 This assumption
is widely shared in our society. To cite but one prominent example,
the United States Catholic Bishops, in their controversial pastoral
letter on economic justice, stated: "Corporate mergers and hostile
takeovers may bring greater benefits to shareholders, but they often
lead to decreased concern for the well-being of local communities and
make towns and cities more vulnerable to decisions made from
afar."'134 Polling data confirms that this sort of skepticism toward
takeovers is widely shared.135
The Bishops' arguments, like those made by supporters of non-
shareholder constituency statutes, pose two inextricably intertwined
regarding who wins or loses remains unchanged. As the next Section postulates, how-
ever, those legislative statements remain wholly inapplicable to the structural context.
132. Some may object that the traditional rhetoric is important as a forceful re-
minder of where the director's loyalty lies. Even if the rhetoric was unenforceable, it
was an ever present goad. By removing it, the statutes may effectively encourage di-
rectors to depart from shareholder interests. If so, the statutes' main impact will not
be a legal one, but rather a change in the psychology of board decision-making. As
indicated in the text, however, most operational decisions do not pose significant con-
flicts between long-term shareholder and stakeholder interests.
133. Opponents of state takeover legislation generally posit, that nonshareholder
constituency statutes are not designed to protect stakeholders, but rather are designed
to protect senior corporate managers. See, e.g., Carney, supra note 123, at 423-24. This
was almost certainly the intent of the lawyers who draft these statutes, but the limited
legislative history that is available reflects a real concern for nonshareholder constitu-
encies on the part of many legislators. See supra note 115.
134. BISHOPs' LETrER, supra note 12, at 152.
135. Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public
Opinion, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 457, 490-503 (1988).
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policy issues. First, do stakeholder and shareholder interests in fact
diverge in the structural context? Second, are the duties of corporate
directors an appropriate place to address that problem?
a. Shareholders versus Stakeholders
A wealth of anecdotal evidence suggests that stakeholders are
harmed by corporate takeovers. Some commentators also propose a
theoretical basis for so concluding. On close examination, however,
neither argument is fully persuasive.
i. The Anecdotal Evidence
The AFL-CIO estimates that 500,000 jobs were lost as a direct re-
sult of takeover activity between 1983 and 1987.136 According to The
Wall Street Journal, between January 1984 and mid-July of 1985,
there were ninety-eight operational restructurings of companies re-
sulting from or following acquisitions, which affected approximately
557,464 employees.' 3 7 In addition to lost jobs, takeovers may ad-
versely affect employees in a variety of other ways. For example, ac-
quiring companies frequently utilize funds taken out of the target
company's pension plans to help finance the acquisition.138 Because
of these well known phenomena, many employees quit immediately
when a takeover bid is made; those who do not quit often are so dis-
tracted from their work that the company suffers anyway.139 Peter
Drucker thus spoke for many when he observed that "employees,
from senior middle managers down to the rank and file in the office
136. S. REP. No. 265, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1987). See generally O'Connor,
supra note 15, at 1196-1203 (discussing impact of takeovers on target employees).
137. Shifting Strategies, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 1985, at 1.
138. One commentator identified the following examples of this phenomenon: Mo-
bil obtained $29 million from the Superior Oil fund; Pantry Pride, $88 million from
Revlon's fund; Irwin Jacobs, $97 million from AMF's pension fund, nearly 20% of the
total purchase price; Texaco, $250 million from the Cities Service pension fund. In
conclusion, the commentator asked, "What is the long-range impact on the morale and
productivity of the American work force, white collar as well as blue collar?" LEIGH
B. TREVOR, HOSTILE TAKEOVERS-THE KILLING FIELD OF CORPORATE AMERICA, Ad-
dress to the Financial Executives Institute, Mar. 11, 1986 at 15-16.
139. Here Comes the "Tin" Parachute, DUN's Bus. MONTH, Jan. 1987, at 62. Accord-
ing to one takeover specialist:
[i]f there are wholesale firings or, as usually happens following a hostile take-
over, many executives leave, the acquired business often loses momentum.
The people who leave are usually key employees, and many of those who re-
main vegetate rather than make waves. Employee morale and efficiency de-
cline. Productivity suffers, creativity fades. In time the damaged company is
quietly "phased out" or, if it is salvageable, sold off.
Arthur Burck, The Hidden Trauma of Merger Mania, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 6, 1982, at 14.
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or factory floor, are increasingly being demoralized-a thoughtful
union leader of my acquaintance calls it 'traumatized'-by the fear of
a takeover raid."140
Corporate takeovers also affect the communities in which the cor-
poration has plants and other facilities. In the wake of Boone Pick-
ens' raid on Phillips Petroleum, for example, Phillips eliminated
2,700 jobs in its Bartlesville, Oklahoma headquarters. Because Bar-
tlesville's population was only 36,000, this reduction devastated the
local community.' 4i Similar tales of woe could be told of many com-
munities affected by takeover-related corporate restructurings.' 42
Highly-leveraged takeovers likewise affect the interests of bond-
holders and other corporate creditors. As the theory goes, pre-take-
over creditors assessed the corporation's creditworthiness and set
their loan terms based on the corporation's existing assets and debt-
equity ratios. In a highly-leveraged acquisition, the raider finances
the acquisition by borrowing against target corporation assets and/or
selling target assets. This significantly lowers the corporation's
creditworthiness, yet pre-takeover creditors are not compensated for
this loss. Bondholders are particularly hard hit. Bond rating agen-
cies routinely downgrade a corporation's pre-takeover bonds to re-
flect the firm's increased riskiness post-takeover. That downgrading
immediately lowers the pre-takeover bonds' market value.' 43
ii. A Contractarian Theory
Recently, a number of commentators have advanced theoretical ba-
ses for the claim that takeovers are detrimental to nonshareholder
corporate constituents. Typically, these theories build on the so-
called nexus of contracts model of the corporation. Because they al-
low the anecdotal evidence recounted above to be generalized as in-
dicative of the societal impact of corporate takeovers, these
arguments have been used by some to justify director consideration
of stakeholder interests in the decision-making process.
As the public corporation was traditionally conceptualized,144 stock
140. Peter F. Drucker, Taming the Corporate Takeover, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 1984,
at 30.
141. S. Rep. No. 265, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1987) (separate views of Senators
Sasser, Sanford, and Chaffee).
142. See, e.g., Newlin & Gilmer, supra note 86, at 111 (Gulf Oil's acquisition by
Standard Oil of California estimated to have cost Pittsburgh 2,000 jobs and $2 million
per year in lost charitable contributions).
143. McDaniel, supra note 86, at 206-09. Excessive takeover-related debt also pur-
portedly produces a short-term focus by management that is detrimental to economic
growth. See S. Rep. No. 265 at 73-75.
144. Various theories of the firm have been advanced over the years. This Article
describes the two leading candidates: the corporation as a thing; and the corporation as
a nexus of contracts. For a useful overview of the broader debate over the nature of
the firm, see David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201.
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ownership is no different than any other species of private property.
Shareholders own the company. Directors are fiduciaries employed
by the shareholders to conduct the business on their behalf. If a
board decision protects stakeholder interests by harming those of
shareholders, the directors are quite literally stealing from the
shareholders:
In a free enterprise, private property system, a corporate executive is an
employee of the owners of the business. He has a direct responsibility to his
employers. That responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with
their desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible
while conforming to the basic rules of society .... Insofar as his actions in
accord with his "social responsibility" reduce returns to stockholders, he is
spending their money.14 5
Because private property is such a profound part of the American
ethos, this model's ethical implications strongly influence United
States courts and lawmakers. The corporation is a thing, so it can be
owned. The shareholders own the corporation, so directors are
merely stewards of their interests. Because no one can serve two
masters at the same time, if shareholder and stakeholder interests
conflict, directors cannot be loyal to both constituencies. The board
of directors' role as stewards requires it to prefer the interests of its
shareholder masters.
Although this argument has surface attraction, it depends upon the
corporation being an entity capable of being owned. The traditional
model reified the corporation by treating it as an entity separate from
the various inputs making up the web. While reification is a neces-
sary shorthand, it also is really all that permits one to think of the
corporation as having owners.
The nexus' of contracts theory of the firm rejects the traditional
model. While the contractarian approach naturally obtains a some-
what different spin from each of its proponents,146 all visualize the
firm not as an entity but as an aggregate of various inputs acting to-
gether to produce goods or services. Employees provide labor. Credi-
tors provide debt capital. Shareholders initially provide equity
capital and subsequently bear the risk of loss and monitor the per-
formance of management. Management monitors the performance of
145. Davis, supra note 8, at 41 (quoting Milton Friedman).
146. See generally Frank A. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Con-
tract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989); Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of
the Firm:h Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305 (1976); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J.
POL. ECON. 288, 291-93; Eugene F. Fama & Michael Jensen, Separation of Ownership
and Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 301 (1983).
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employees and coordinates the activities of all the firm's inputs. In
this model, the firm is a legal fiction representing a complex set of
contractual relationships. In other words, the firm is not a thing, but
rather a nexus or web of explicit and implicit contracts establishing
rights and obligations among the various inputs making up the firm.
Because shareholders are simply one of the inputs bound together by
this web of voluntary agreements, ownership is not a meaningful con-
cept under this model.' 47 Each input is owned by some one, but no
one input owns the totality.
The contractarian model potentially has profound implications for
the relationship of shareholders and stakeholders. It arguably jetti-
sons the ethical baggage inherent in the private property model,
eliminating the principal basis for favoring shareholders over stake-
holders. Most contractarians nevertheless remain devout believers in
shareholder wealth maximization. 148
For a few contractarians, however, the nexus of the contracts
model provides a theoretical basis for protecting nonshareholder in-
terests. As the basic argument goes,149 many of the contracts making
up the corporation are implicit and therefore judicially unenforce-
able. Some of these implicit contracts are intended to encourage
stakeholders to make firm-specific investments. Consider an em-
ployee who invests considerable time and effort in learning how to do
her job more effectively. Much of this knowledge will be specific to
the firm for which she works. In some cases, this will be because
other firms do not do comparable work. In others, it will be because
her firm has a unique corporate culture. In either case, the longer
she works for the firm, the more difficult it becomes for her to obtain
a comparable position with some other firm.
An employee will invest in firm-specific human capital only if re-
warded for doing so. An implicit contract thus comes into existence
between employees and shareholders. On the one hand, employees
promise to become more productive by investing in firm-specific
human capital. They bond the performance of that promise by ac-
cepting long promotion ladders and compensation schemes that defer
147. John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders versus Managers: The Strain in the Corpo-
rate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 16 (1986); Fama, supra note 146, at 290; Jonathan R. Ma-
cey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of
Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 179; O'Connor, supra note 15, at
1204.
148. See, e.g., Frank A. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law,
26 J. L. & ECON. 395, 403-06 (1983); Bengt Holmstrom, Commen4 in CORPORATE TAKE-
OVERS 56 (Alan J. Auerbach ed. 1988); Macey, supra note 147.
149. See generally Coffee, supra note 147; McDaniel, supra note 111, at 123-26;
O'Connor, supra note 15, at 1203-22; Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach
of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES,
33 (Alan J. Auerbach ed. 1988).
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much of the return on their investment until the final years of their
career. In return, shareholders promise job security.
While the employee-shareholder relationship is the paradigmatic
implicit contract, other stakeholders supposedly make similar invest-
ments in firms. Communities, for example, often specialize around a
given firm. The community receives a variety of services from the
firm, but also provides the firm with a specialized infrastructure, tax
breaks, and other benefits.
The long-term nature of the relationship between stakeholders and
corporations forces the stakeholders to rely on implicit, rather than
explicit, contracts. 5 0 Bargaining is costly, especially where future
contingencies are hard to predict. The longer the contractual term,
the more costly bargaining becomes. Implicit contracts can be read-
justed as needed and thus save all the parties bargaining costs.
The implicit nature of these contracts, however, leaves stakehold-
ers vulnerable to opportunistic corporate actions. Shareholders can
protect themselves against opportunism by holding a fully diversified
portfolio. By definition, the stakeholder's investment in firm-specific
human capital is not diversifiable. The shareholders' ready ability to
exit the firm by selling their stock also protects them. In contrast,
the stakeholder's investment in firm-specific human capital also
makes it more difficult for them to exit the firm in response to op-
portunistic behavior.
As the theory goes, this vulnerability comes home to roost in hos-
tile takeovers. In all hostile acquisitions, the shareholders receive a
premium for their shares. Where does that premium come from?
Recall that the employees' implicit contract involved delaying part of
their compensation until the end of their careers. If the bidder fires
those workers before the natural end of their careers, replacing them
with cheaper young workers, or if the bidder obtains wage or other
concessions from the existing workers by threatening to displace
150. Some commentators aver that stakeholders can protect themselves from the
breach problem through explicit contracts, such as bond indenture trusts and union
collective bargaining agreements, or through reliance on competitive markets for their
services E.g., Carney, supra note 123, at 394-417; Hanks, supra note 15, at 25; Macey,
supra note 147; Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales
for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21
STETSON L. REV. 2:3, 36-43 (1991). This argument is too glib for other commentators,
who point out that explicit contracting is always costly and in some cases, as in a non-
unionized workplace, impractical. E.g., O'Connor, supra note 15, at 1214-18; Katherine
Stone, Employees as Stakeholders under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes,
21 STETSON L. REV. 45, 54-61 (1991).
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them or to close the plant, the employees will not receive the full
value of the services they provided to the corporation. Accordingly, a
substantial part of the takeover premium consists of a wealth trans-
fer from stakeholders to shareholders.151
iii. Summary
In light of the foregoing arguments, public suspicion of hostile
takeovers is not particularly surprising. Shareholders seem to be get-
ting rich at the expense of rank and file employees and other stake-
holders. Moreover, in light of the moral obligation to keep one's
promises, shareholders appear to be acting immorally by breaching
the implicit contracts they made with the stakeholders. When direc-
tors resist hostile takeover bids, they seem to be protecting their non-
shareholder constituents from unethical shareholder behavior.
There are any number of problems with this thesis, however. For
one thing, there simply is no good empirical evidence that any class
of stakeholders is systematically harmed by takeovers. Granted,
there is a wealth of anecdotal evidence that stakeholders are harmed
by corporate takeovers. However, good news rarely makes headlines.
Just so, good takeovers rarely become anecdotes.
In fact, there are few credible empirical studies of the effect of
takeovers on nonshareholder constituents of target companies. The
existing studies, most of which find little or no detrimental effect on
stakeholders, must be approached with some caution, as all can be
criticized on various grounds. One study, for example, found that
takeovers had no adverse affect on bondholders.152 But it involved
negotiated mergers rather than hostile takeovers and, moreover, an-
tedated the wave of highly-leveraged bids in the 1980s. Another
study found that takeovers had little effect on employee wages.153
But its sample included only very small firms and data from only one
state. In light of these flaws, relatively little can be said with confi-
dence and firm conclusions cannot be drawn.
The theoretical justification for protecting nonshareholders is not
unappealing, but is counterbalanced by sound theoretical arguments
that stakeholders are not systematically harmed by takeovers. Take-
overs resulting in wholesale purges of the blue collar work force are
151. Of course, even proponents of this theory would not contend that this is the
sole source of takeover premia. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Uncertain Case for
Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis. L.
REV. 435, 443-47 (describing sources of takeover premia).
152. E.g., Asquith & Kim, The Impact of Merger Bids on the Participating Firms'
Security Holders, 37 J. FIN. 1209 (1982).
153. Charles Brown & James L. Medoff, The Impact of Firm Acquisitions on La-
bor, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 9 (Alan J. Auerbach ed.
1988).
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rare. Indeed, the firm's workers may actually benefit from a change
of control. A fairly standard explanation for takeover premiums
posits that the bidder profits by displacing inefficient incumbent
managers. Another fairly standard explanation posits that the bidder
reaps synergistic gains by meshing the target's business with its own.
In either case, if the takeover makes the target firm more profitable
and productive, the target's rank and file workers should have im-
proved job security and higher wages.154 The point is not that stake-
holder and shareholder interests always converge in takeovers;
sometimes they do diverge. The point is simply that there is no sys-
tematic conflict between stakeholders and shareholders; instead,
analysis must proceed on a case by case basis.
All of this leads us to the second question posed at the beginning of
this section: Are the fiduciary duties of target managers an appropri-
ate place to address potential stakeholder injury? States adopting
nonshareholder constituency statutes clearly have answered that
question in the affirmative. In light of the foregoing analysis, propo-
nents of nonshareholder constituency statutes might argue that there
is no practical, general legislative solution to the risks posed by cor-
porate takeovers. Instead, they might argue, each case must be ana-
lyzed on its own merits and no one is in a better position to make
that analysis than the corporation's directors. The next section, how-
ever, suggests reasons to be skeptical about that line of reasoning. In-
deed, when corporate managers resist hostile takeover bids, they are
more likely to be looking out for their own interests than those of
their shareholders or their stakeholders.
b. Shareholders and Stakeholders versus Managers
Inherent in all corporate takeovers is a well-documented conflict
between the interests of target managers and target shareholders.
The tension between shareholders and managers is perhaps most ob-
vious in hostile takeovers. Shareholders unquestionably benefit from
a successful takeover. Successful bids produce positive abnormal re-
turns for targets ranging from 16.9 percent to 34.1 percent, with a
weighted average of 29.1 percent.155 Moreover, target shareholders
154. Admittedly, few labor leaders seem to see it this way. Nonshareholder "inter-
ests regularly join the clamor for protection from hostile bids and appreciate the fact
that facing a rifle with one bullet (managerial latitude) is better than facing one with
two (hostile bidders as well)." Lyman Johnson, Sovereignty Over Corporate Stock, 16
DEL. J. CORP. L. 485, 542 (1991) (footnote omitted).
155. See Frank A. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tac-
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appear to capture the most of the gains, as abnormal positive returns
to bidding firms range from 2.4 percent to 6.7 percent, with a
weighted average of 3.8 percent. If a hostile takeover bid fails be-
cause of management resistance, the consequences to target company
shareholders are thus quite severe.1 56
In contrast, incumbent target managers are the one group
unarguably harmed by hostile takeovers. In today's hostile takeover
environment, target directors and officers know that a successful bid-
der is likely to fire many of them.157 Any defensive actions by man-
agement are thus tainted by the specter of self-interest. This may be
so even if the directors are nominally independent outsiders. As
Judge Posner explains:
When managers are busy erecting obstacles to the taking over of the corpora-
tion by an investor who is likely to fire them if the takeover attempt succeeds,
they have a clear conflict of interest, and it is not cured by vesting the power
of decision in a board of directors in which insiders are a minority .... No one
likes to be fired, whether he is just a director or also an officer. The so-called
outsiders moreover are often friends of the insiders. And since they spend
only part of their time on the affairs of the corporation, their knowledge of
those affairs is much less than that of the insiders, to whom they are likely
therefore to defer.1 58
Similar conflicts of interest arise in negotiated acquisitions. Be-
cause approval by the target's board of directors is a necessary pre-
requisite to most acquisition methods, the modern corporate
statutory scheme gives management considerable power in negotiated
acquisitions. To purchase the board's cooperation, the bidder may of-
fer side payments to management, such as an equity stake in the sur-
viving entity, employment or non-competition contracts, substantial
severance payments, continuation of existing fringe benefits or other
compensation arrangements.159 Although it is undoubtedly rare for
tics, and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAw. 1733 (1981); Frank A. Easterbrook &
Gregg A. Jarrell, Do Targets Gain From Defeating Tender Offers?, 59 N.Y.U.L. REV.
277 (1984); Gregg A. Jarrell, James A. Brickley & Jeffry Netter, The Market for Corpo-
rate Control The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 49 (1988); Michael
Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evi-
dence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983).
156. Proponents of corporate takeovers generally argue that shareholders benefit
not only directly from takeover premiums, but also indirectly because the disciplining
effect of hostile takeovers encourages all corporate managers-not just those fighting
off a takeover bid-to maximize shareholder wealth. Accordingly, they argue that any
restrictions on takeovers eliminates an important check on management shirking and
self-interest. See Clark, supra note 42, at 589-92.
157. Kenneth J. Martin and John J. McConnell, Corporate Performance, Corporate
Takeovers, and Management Turnover, 46 J. FIN. 671 (1991).
158. Dynamics Corp. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other
grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
159. E.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) (target directors offered
employment contracts); Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050 (Del. Ch. 1984) (plaintiff
alleged tender offeror modified bid to benefit target managers); Repairman's Service
Corp. v. National Intergroup, Inc., No. 7811, slip op. (Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 1985), reprinted
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side payments to be so large as to materially affect the price the bid-
der would otherwise be able to pay target shareholders, side pay-
ments may affect management's decision-making by causing them to
agree to an acquisition price lower than that which could be obtained
from hard bargaining or open bidding.160
Even where management is not consciously seeking side-payments
from the bidder, a conflict of interest can still arise:
There may be at work [in negotiated acquisitions] a force more subtle than a
desire to maintain a title or office in order to assure continued salary or per-
quisites. Many people commit a huge portion of their lives to a single large-
scale business organization. They derive their identity in part from that or-
ganization and feel that they contribute to the identity of the firm. The mis-
sion of the firm is not seen by those involved with it as wholly economic, nor
the continued existence of its distinctive identity as a matter of
indifference.1 6 1
Although such motivations are understandable, they conflict with the
shareholders' economic interests.
Corporate acquisitions are thus a classic example of what econo-
mists refer to as "final period problems."'162 Recall that in repeat
transactions the risk of self-dealing by one party is constrained by the
threat that other party will punish the cheating party in future trans-
actions. In a final period transaction, this constraint disappears. Be-
cause the final period transaction is the last in the series, the threat
of future punishment disappears.
Just so, the various extrajudicial constraints imposed on manage-
ment in the operational context break down in the structural con-
text. As a result, management is no longer subject to either
shareholder or market penalties for self-dealing.163 Accordingly, in
in 10 DEL. J. COR'. L. 902 (1985) (plaintiff claimed target managers sought "prefer-
ences for themselves" in surviving entity).
160. E.g., Pupecki v. James Madison Corp., 382 N.E.2d 1030 (Mass. 1978) (plaintiff
.claimed that consideration for sale of assets was reduced due to side-payments to con-
trolling shareholder); Barr v. Wackman, 329 N.E. 2d 180 (N.Y. 1975) (plaintiff claimed
target directors agreed to low acquisition price in exchange for employment contracts).
161. In re Time Inc. Shareholders Litigation [1989] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514
at 93,268-69 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), offd Paramount Comm. Inc. v. Time Inc. sub
nom. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). While a potential conflict of interest therefore is pres-
ent in all negotiated acquisitions, that conflict is usually constrained by the threat of
competing bids. See Bainbridge, supra note 57, at 275. But where the target board of
directors seeks to preclude competitive bidding by granting a lock-up to the favored
bidder, for example, a more intrusive standard of review is required. See id at 323.
Although the model developed below focuses on hostile takeovers, its application to
negotiated acquisitions is described infra note 207.
162. RONALD J. GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 579
(1986).
163. Id, at 579; Carney, supra note 128, at 422-23.
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the structural context there is good reason to be skeptical of manage-
ment claims to be acting in the shareholders' best interests.
The conflict between management and shareholder interests is es-
pecially troubling because it also provides a good reason to be skepti-
cal of management claims to be acting in the stakeholders' best
interests. Suppose, for example, that the hypothetical XYZ board re-
ceives a hostile takeover bid. The bidder's disclosure documents state
its intention to close a target plant. The board rejects the bid, citing
the bidder's plans for the plant. An honest concern for the
threatened workers may have motivated the directors' decision. But
so too may have a concern for their own positions and perquisites.
Indeed, it is not at all hard to imagine a target board using non-
shareholder interests as nothing more than a negotiating device to
extract a higher acquisition price and/or side payments from the
bidder.
In fact, all too many United States corporate directors are hypocrit-
ical about nonshareholder interests.164 Many of the same directors
who so vigorously lobby state legislators in favor of nonshareholder
constituency statutes are equally vigorous in opposing plant closing
laws and other worker protection statutes.165 Many of the same di-
rectors who bewail the jobs lost after successful corporate takeovers
are silent about the jobs lost because of management defensive tac-
tics. Many of the same directors who champion stakeholder interests
in disputes with shareholders champion shareholder interests in dis-
putes with unions and other constituencies. Indeed, the ultimate
irony may be that much of the anecdotal evidence on stakeholder in-
jury described above relates to employees fired after defensive
restructurings used by incumbent managers to defeat a hostile bid.166
In sum, as Judgd Easterbrook put it, "no evidence of which we are
aware suggests that bidders confiscate workers, and other partici-
pants' investments to any greater degree than do incumbents-who
may (and frequently do) close or move plants to follow the prospect
164. This is not to say that all directors who claim to be concerned for non-
shareholder constituencies are hypocrites. While many directors are hypocritical,
many are legitimately concerned for stakeholder welfare. The key point, however, is
that all directors, hypocritical or not, have a conflict of interest. This is true even if
the director honestly believes that he is acting in good faith. As Chancellor Allen has
pointed out, "human nature may incline even one acting in subjective good faith to ra-
tionalize as right that which is merely personally beneficial." City Capital Assoc. v.
Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 796 (Del. Ch.) (emphasis omitted), appeal dismissed, 556
A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988).
165. O'Connor, supra note 15, at 1233.
166. For example, although much has been made of the lay-offs at Gulf Oil follow-
ing Boone Pickens' attempted takeover of Gulf, Gulf had voluntarily eliminated over
15,000 jobs even before Pickens appeared on the scene. 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
423-24 (1988).
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There is a very real possibility that unscrupulous directors will use
nonshareholder interests to cloak their own self-interested behavior.
Selfish decisions easily could be justified by an appropriate paper
trail of tears over the employees' fate. This then is the real vice of
nonshareholder constituency statutes. While they allow honest direc-
tors to act in the best interests of all the corporation's constituents,
they also may protect dishonest directors who are acting solely in
their own interest. All of this tends to suggest that legislatures ought
to think twice about adopting nonshareholder constituency statutes
without first addressing management's conflict of interest.168
This Article, however, is mainly concerned with the problems
courts will face in interpreting the nonshareholder constituency stat-
utes that are already on the books. What does the foregoing analysis
tell such courts? The point is not that target directors have no role
to play in corporate takeovers or that target directors should ignore
stakeholder interests in making structural decisions. Whatever the
theoretical merits of a rule requiring management passivity in the
face of a hostile takeover bid,169 the nonshareholder constituency
167. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 500 n.5 (7th
Cir.), cert denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989).
168. In particular, this Article's analysis suggests that legislatures should not follow
Indiana and Pennsylvania's approach of limiting judicial review to the business judg-
ment rule. Because business judgment review is wholly unsuited to cases involving
conflicts of interest, this Article proposes a more exacting level of judicial scrutiny,
which should deter much management misconduct and assist courts to capture miscon-
duct when it occurs. By prohibiting such an approach, Indiana and Pennsylvania have
precluded meaningful judicial review and allow management misconduct to go
unsanctioned.
169. Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel, are the leading proponents of the
passivity approach. See Frank A. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of
a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981);
Frank A. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers,
35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982). Their model has been uniformly rejected by the courts. See,
e.g., GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating
that "[t]he exercise of independent, honest business judgment of an enlightened and
disinterested Board is the traditional and appropriate way to deal fairly and even-
handedly with both the protection of investors, on the one hand, and the legitimate
concerns of employees and management of a corporation who service the interests of
investors, on the other"); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 n.10
(Del. 1985) (stating that "[i]t has been suggested that a board's response to a takeover
threat should be a passive one. However, that clearly is not the law of Delaware, and
as the proponents of this rule of passivity readily concede, it has not been adopted
either by courts or state legislatures." [citations omitted]).
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statutes plainly reject any such requirement. Rather, as we have
seen, their premise is that shareholder and stakeholder interests con-
flict in corporate takeovers and that the target's directors are in the
best position to reconcile those competing interests.170 Nor, in fair-
ness, is this a wholly implausible assumption. Despite the need for
skepticism about management's motives, it is worth remembering
that "having a 'conflict of interest' is not something one is 'guilty of';
it is simply a state of affairs."171 The fact that the board has a con-
flict of interest thus does not necessarily mean that its conduct will
be inconsistent with the best interests of any or all of the corpora-
tion's other constituents.172 Given human nature and the tempta-
tions otherwise left unchecked, however, courts should interpret the
statutes so as to provide a mechanism for distinguishing legitimate
concern for stakeholders from false concern motivated by self-inter-
est. The next section turns to that task.
2. A Model for Structural Decisions
Virtually no operational decisions are judicially reviewed; indeed,
virtually none are noticed by shareholders or even by directors. Once
again, the structural context is quite different. When directors seek
to justify takeover defenses by reference to nonshareholder concerns,
their decision inevitably will be challenged by shareholders and/or
the hostile bidder. While the nonshareholder constituency statutes
clarify that it is appropriate for directors to consider those concerns
in structural, as well as operational, decisions, the legal system
should not ignore the very real risk that the directors' justification is
a ruse. In structural decisions, the law therefore must separate those
instances of honest director concern for nonshareholder interests
from selfish director concern for their own positions. Happily, such a
mechanism is close at hand: Unocal's shifting burdens of proof will
do quite nicely by analogy.173
170. The GAF court could have been speaking for the legislative proponents of non-
shareholder constituency statutes when it observed:
A corporation with a perceived threat of dismemberment... owes substantial
regard for [employee's] pension benefits, and in the case of loyal management,
severance benefits. These legitimate concerns for [the directors'] past conduct
of the enterprise and its requirements need not be left to the goodwill of an
unfriendly acquirer of corporate control in the jungle warfare involving at-
tempted takeovers.
GAF Corp. 624 F. Supp. at 1019-20.
171. Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation
Act-Amendments Pertaining to Directors' Coiiflicting Interest Transactions, 44 Bus.
LAW. 1307, 1309 (1989).
172. Id. (stating that "while the history of mankind is replete with acts of selfish-
ness, we have all also witnessed countless acts taken by persons contrary to their per-
sonal self-interest").
173. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). The Unocal-
based model proposed herein draws principally on the interpretation of Unocal pre-
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In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court acknowledged "the omni-
present specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own inter-
ests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders."174
As discussed in Part I, the court responded by adopting a two pro-
nged standard requiring directors who adopt a takeover defense to
show that (1) they had reasonable grounds for believing that a threat
to corporate policy and effectiveness existed, a burden which, among
other things, requires proof of good faith and reasonable investiga-
tion, and (2) the defense was reasonable in relation to the threat
posed by the offer.175 If the directors satisfy this standard, they get
the benefits of the business judgment rule and the burden of proof
shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the directors breached their
fiduciary duties.
As also discussed in Part I, threats to nonshareholder constituen-
cies originally were a cognizable threat under Unocal. Revlon, how-
ever, limited the use of threats to nonshareholder interests to those
cases in which the defensive action also benefited shareholders.176
As Part II demonstrated, the nonshareholder constituency statutes
reject the Revlon gloss. Absent the unique provisions found in the
Indiana and Pennsylvania statutes, however, the nonshareholder con-
stituency statutes need not be interpreted as barring a Unocal-type
test.
An apt precedent for this thesis is provided by the prevailing judi-
cial interpretation of interested director transaction statutes. Despite
numerous variations, most interested director statutes follow the
same basic theme. Typically, a transaction between a director and
the corporation is not voidable solely because of the director's inter-
est in the trarsaction if it is approved by a majority of the disinter-
ested directors or by a majority of the shareholders, or if the director
can prove that the transaction is fair to the corporation. 177 On their
face, most of these statutes appear to validate any transaction ratified
by the board or the shareholders, even if the transaction is unfair to
vailing before the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Paramount Comm., Inc. v.
Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). In addition to making a variety of changes to the
Unocal standard (none directly relevant here), Time fairly can be read as indicating
that Unocal will be applied with lessened vigor in future Delaware cases. See id at
1153-55. If so, the standard's ability to capture cases of management misconduct will
be significantly lesened as well. See Bainbridge, supra note 57, at 318.
174. Unocal Cotp. 493 A.2d at 954.
175. Id at 955.
176. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
177. CLARK, suptra note 42, at 166-67.
1015
the shareholders. Most courts, however, have held that judicial re-
view for fairness of the transaction can still be had even if the trans-
action has been ratified.178
Not every interested director transaction involves self-dealing, but
the high probability of misconduct in this context led courts to per-
mit review even of transactions that are properly ratified and to im-
pose a very exacting standard on unratified transactions. The
significant risk of self-interested director behavior in corporate acqui-
sitions similarly justifies exacting judicial scrutiny of claims that the
directors were acting to protect nonshareholder interests. Accord-
ingly, unless the legislature has clearly prohibited courts from impos-
ing a heightened standard of review, courts should read a Unocal-
type standard into the nonshareholder constituency statutes.
As previously stated, under the first Unocal prong the directors
must identify a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness. By anal-
ogy, under this Article's interpretation of nonshareholder constitu-
ency statutes, a court should first require the directors to show that
the takeover bid poses a threat to one of the enumerated non-
shareholder interests.179 This initial task should not prove too diffi-
cult for the directors. Presumably, the requisite threats could take a
variety of forms: lay-offs, plant closings, downgrading of bonds, and
the like.i8 0
178. Id. at 169-70. In most jurisdictions, an effective ratification shifts the burden of
proof to the complaining party who then must show that the transaction amounts to a
waste of corporate assets. Id, at 178-79. If the transaction is not properly ratified by
either the board or shareholders, the defendant directors have the burden of proving
that the transaction is fair to the corporation. Id Of course, the rules governing deriv-
ative litigation will frequently limit a shareholder's ability to obtain judicial review of
an interested director transaction. See supra note 120 (describing effect of derivative
suit rules on judicial review of operational decisions).
179. Usually, decision-making should be delegated to independent directors. See
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. Granting that purportedly independent directors are often bi-
ased in favor of managers, delegating responsibility to the outside board members at
least avoids the appearance of impropriety and may actually help avoid some abuses.
Once in charge, the independent directors should determine whether a threat to non-
shareholder interests exists. If so, the directors should then determine what response
is appropriate to the threat posed by the bid. Id.
180. In the face of a nonshareholder constituency statute, especially as interpreted
herein, the hostile bidder will have an incentive to keep its post-acquisition plans as
secret as possible. By not disclosing its plans, the bidder makes it harder for target
management to identify a threat to nonshareholder interests justifying management
resistance to the bid. In many cases, however, this will not be a very serious problem.
Some aspects of the bidder's plans must be disclosed pursuant to the federal securi-
ties laws. For example, Item 5 of Schedule 14D-1 requires a tender offeror to disclose
plans which would result in a sale or transfer of a material amount of target assets,
which might alert management to potential effects on employees or communities; like-
wise, Item 4 requires disclosure of the sources of financing, which will alert manage-
ment to a possible impact on existing creditors. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1990).
State antitakeover laws often require even more exacting disclosures. For example,
Pennsylvania's control share acquisition statute requires the bidder to disclose, among
other things, any plans to close target plants. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2566(a)(6)(iii)
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Again, by analogy to the first Unocal prong, a court should also re-
quire director.; to show that they acted in good faith and after a rea-
sonable investigation. The good faith element requires a showing
that the directors acted in response to a perceived threat to the cor-
poration and not for the purpose of entrenching themselves in of-
fice.181 As such, this element necessarily involves a subjective
inquiry into the directors' motives. Admittedly, courts are poorly
suited to this sort of inquiry.I8 2 Absent the proverbial smoking gun it
will be difficult to distinguish cases involving self-interested director
behavior from cases involving legitimate director concern for stake-
holders. Nonetheless, retaining a subjective component to the analy-
sis can be justified on several grounds. First, judicial review is better
than no review. Many takeover decisions are subject to review by the
market. For example, when a board agrees to merge with one of sev-
eral potential bidders, motive analysis is unnecessary. As long as the
board fairly conducted an auction amongst the competing bidders, the
market will have demonstrated the merger's fairness.1s 3 However,
when a board rejects a hostile takeover bid on nonmonetary grounds,
by definition a market test is unavailable. In effect, the directors are
asking to be exempted from a market test because of the takeover's
alleged impact on nonshareholder constituents. As such, a motive
based inquiry becomes more justifiable. At the very least, it captures
gross cases in which there is good evidence-either direct or circum-
stantial-that the board acted for its own interest. Second, and more
importantly, the test proposed here is not limited to a subjective mo-
tive analysis. Instead, the good faith element is primarily intended to
force the directors to articulate a nonself-interested rationale for
(Purdon 1991). It is questionable, however, whether these state disclosure require-
ments will withstand constitutional scrutiny. See Hyde Park Partners, L.P. v. Con-
nolly, 839 F.2d 837, 848-53 (1st Cir. 1988) (state tender offer disclosure statute
preempted where it required bidder to make disclosures at a time earlier than re-
quired by federal law); National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,374 at 92,260 (W.D.Mo. 1981) (state insurance
statute preempted by federal proxy rules because it required greater disclosures from
proxy insurgent than required by federal law).
181. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
182. Cf ALI PROJECT, supra note 19, at 532 (stating that motive-based duty of loy-
alty analysis is inappropriate for the takeover context, because it "cannot effectively
distinguish cases in which directors favored themselves and cases in which directors
properly looked to the interest of the shareholders"); Bainbridge, supra note 57, at 291
(declaring subjective analysis inappropriate for lock-up decisions); Davis, supra note
19, at 23-25 (indicating that courts have difficulty with subjective analysis of director
motives).
183. Bainbridge, supra note 57, at 323-32.
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their action. The directors' stated rationale can then be tested
against the model's objective standards, which have the primary re-
sponsibility for capturing cases of director misconduct. Finally, as
further described below, the obligation to construct a disinterested
rationale for the decision may deter many boards from self-interested
behavior in the first place.
The reasonable investigation element requires a demonstration
that the board was adequately informed, with the relevant standard
being whether they were grossly negligent in conducting their inves-
tigation. 8 4 The problem, of course, is to define what constitutes
gross negligence. In Smith v. Van Gorkom, 8 5 the Delaware
Supreme Court held that directors who approved a friendly merger
were grossly negligent because they failed to inform themselves of all
material information reasonably available to them. 8 6 The ALl pro-
poses a somewhat different formulation, pursuant to which directors
must inform themselves merely to the extent that they reasonably
believe is appropriate under the circumstances. 187 The ALI standard
thus permits directors to make decisions on less than all reasonably
available information if they reasonably believe doing so is appropri-
ate given the situation. 8 8 In contrast, such a decision would violate
Van Gorkom.
The ALI standard is preferable because information is costly. Soci-
etal resources are wasted if managers must invest an additional dol-
lar in gathering information unless there is at least an additional
dollar to be generated from better decision-making. By requiring di-
rectors to have all information "reasonably available" to them, Van
Gorkom may often require directors to over-invest in information.
Moreover, the limited time available to make the decision may re-
quire that the directors take risks to secure what appears to be a
good outcome.' 8 9 Those risks include the possibility that they do not
have all of the relevant facts. A decision to accept this risk in order
to secure the good outcome is perfectly defensible and should be per-
mitted under appropriate circumstances.
The second Unocal prong is the critical one if self-interested man-
agement behavior is to be controlled. Unless the requirement of pro-
portionality between threat and response has real teeth, management
can still use a threat to nonshareholder interests as a cloak for pro-
184. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356-57 (Del. 1985).
185. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
186. Id, at 874. In Moran, the Delaware Supreme Court adopted the Van Gorkom
definition for purposes of applying the Unocal standard. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356.
187. ALI PROJECT, supra note 19, at § 4.01(c)(2).
188. Id. at 230.
189. This seems especially true of the highly pressured, fast-moving hostile take-
over environment.
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tecting their own jobs. Absent an effective proportionality standard,
any threat to nonshareholder interests, no matter how mild or insig-
nificant, would give management a free hand to develop takeover de-
fenses to kill the hostile takeover bid.190
Unfortunately, the courts have not given much guidance as to
when a defensive tactic is reasonable in relation to the threat posed
by a takeover bid. While a defense which absolutely precludes a
tender offer or proxy contests is unreasonable,191 a difficult question
is posed by defenses that are not completely preclusive. Here propor-
tionality basically appears to require that the defense be no more re-
strictive than needed to meet the threat posed.192
Under this approach, management does not have unbridled discre-
tion to disregard shareholder interests in the face of a threat to non-
shareholder constituencies. Unlike Revlon, the test proposed here
does not require that directors affirmatively benefit shareholders. As
Part II demonstrated, one cannot reasonably interpret the non-
shareholder constituency statutes as codifying Revlon. On the other
hand, we also saw in Part II that one cannot reasonably interpret the
statutes as allowing directors to disregard shareholder interests. In-
stead, the statutes allow directors to make trade-offs between share-
holder and stakeholder interests in order to balance those interests.
Accordingly, the standard proposed here merely requires that direc-
tors minimize the effect of their decision on shareholders. 193 In
other words, their decision must impose no greater burden on the
shareholders than necessary to protect the nonshareholder constitu-
encies. If measures less harmful to the shareholders' interest would
have adequately protected the nonshareholder interests at stake, the
target's chosen defensive measures should be invalidated.19 4
190. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 57, at 254. Notably, Professors Gilson and
Kraakman reject any consideration of nonshareholder interests. Id. at 267.
191. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (where the court maintained that "[a] corporation
does not have unbridled discretion to defeat any perceived threat by any Draconian
means available.").
192. See Paramount Comm., Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1155 (Del. 1989).
193. Cf ALI PRtOJECT, supra note 19, at 537 (declaring that directors may consider
nonshareholder interests only to the extent that doing so does not significantly disfa-
vor shareholder interests); McDaniel, supra note 111, at 161 (stating that statutes re-
flect a dual goal of maximizing stockholder gain and minimizing stakeholder loss).
194. Similar tests are used in other corporate conflict of interest transactions. For
example, when a minority close corporation shareholder alleges a breach of fiduciary
duty by the firm's controlling shareholder, the controlling shareholder must first
demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for its actions. If the controlling share-
holder does so, the minority shareholder can still prevail by showing that the same ob-
jective could have been accomplished through an alternative course less harmful to the
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The precise application of this standard will obviously vary from
case to case. Nonetheless, a few suggestive examples may be helpful.
Defenses permanently precluding hostile tender offers, such as de-
fensive restructurings that transfers voting control to management
and its allies, coupled with other defensive tactics that effectively
force shareholders to choose the management-sponsored restructur-
ing over the hostile bid,195 will usually be disproportionate because
they permanently preclude all takeover bids, including those posing
no threat at all.196 At the other extreme, it would be perfectly appro-
priate for a board to refuse to redeem a poison pill while negotiating
with the hostile bidder and/or possible competing bidders.97
Somewhere in the middle is the Revlon fact pattern: an initial hos-
tile bidder, followed by a competing bid from a white knight solicited
by target management. Suppose the hostile bidder offers a higher
price, but the white knight proposes a transaction that protects the
target's stakeholders. The target board rejects the hostile bid, accepts
the white knight's bid, and puts teeth into its decision by granting a
lock-up option to the white knight.198 In assessing the lock-up's va-
lidity, a court should consider such factors as the monetary difference
between the two bids, the extent of the commitment the favored bid-
der has made to nonshareholder constituents, and whether the target
board's bidding procedures fairly tested the market.
Some will immediately object that courts eschew substantive re-
view of board of director decisions. True, the business judgment rule
minority's interest. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. 353 N.E. 2d 657 (Mass.
1976).
195. In City Capital Assoc. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch.), appeal dis-
missed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988), the target corporation adopted a leveraged restruc-
turing as a management-sponsored alternative to a hostile bid. In order to insure that
the shareholders would choose the management-sponsored restructuring, the target's
board refused to redeem a poison pill until after the restructuring was completed.
Chancellor Allen refused to enjoin the restructuring, but did require the board to re-
deem the bill so that shareholders could choose freely between the two alternatives.
Id. at 800.
196. See Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1154-55 (Del. 1989) (holding lock-up and related
defenses granted to protect negotiated merger to be proportionate because, inter alia,
they did not "cram down" a management-sponsored alternative on the shareholders
and did not preclude the competing bidder from making a takeover bid for the com-
bined entity); see also Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 57, at 269-70.
197. See Interco, 551 A.2d at 798 (indicating that the board may leave poison pill in
place while it pursues negotiations with the bidder and/or seeks out alternatives); Gil-
son & Kraakman, supra note 57, at 269-70.
198. Under Delaware law, this scenario could trigger review under Revlon's auc-
tioneering duty; so too might the earlier example of a defensive restructuring that
transfers voting control to management. See generally Bainbridge, supra note 57, at
295-317 (discussing Revlon duties pre- and post-Time). Whether the duty to auction
control can be imposed in a state which has adopted a nonshareholder constituency
statute is an open question. See infra note 207. At a minimum, however, the statutes
do not permit courts to require that directors maximize shareholder wealth in the con-
trol auction context. See supra notes 100-110 and accompanying text.
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precludes judicial review of most board decisions. But the rule's
traditional justification-that judges are not business experts' 99-
simply makes no sense in the structural context, as Unocal recog-
nized.20 0 Judges are not doctors, but they routinely review medical
decisions. Judges are not engineers, but this does not preclude design
defect litigation. Just so, courts can, and do, substantively review
board decisions in contexts, like this one, in which the conflict of in-
terest is so pronounced. The mode of review just proposed for lock-
up options, to take but one example, is perfectly familiar to corporate
law courts. Even under Revlon, directors need not blindly focus on
price to the exclusion of other relevant factors. The board may eval-
uate offers on such grounds as the proposed form of consideration,
tax consequences, firmness of financing, antitrust or other regulatory
obstacles, and timing.201 The interpretive model for nonshareholder
constituency statutes proposed herein merely adds stakeholder inter-
ests to the list. Courts thus should have little difficulty in accommo-
dating that factor into their review.
In any case, judicial review under the proposed test can focus
mainly on questions of process, which are well within the traditional
bounds of judicial competence. In making proportionality assess-
ments, the court should thus scrutinize closely management's argu-
ments and require a convincing demonstration that no less restrictive
defense is available. In doing so, the court should look to such evi-
dence as the specificity of management's plans, the record of the
board's deliberations, and expert testimony from both sides.202 A
showing that the directors were aware of and considered the threat
to nonshareholder interests at the time they decided to resist the
takeover bid is particularly important, because it lowers the likeli-
hood that the threat is an ex post facto justification for selfish
behavior.203
199. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
200. Alternative justifications for the rule are discussed in Joy v. North, 692 F.2d
880, 885-86 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1050 (1983); ALI PROJEcT, supra note
19, at 226; Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 Bus. LAW. 461
(1992).
201. Cottle v. Storer Communications, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 577 (11th Cir. 1988); Cit-
ron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 93,915 at 90, 102-03 (Del. Ch. 1988); Freedman v. Restaurant Assoc. In-
dus., Inc., [1987-88 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,502 at 97,220 (Del.
Ch. 1987).
202. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 57, at 271 (proposing similar list for evalu-
ating threats to shareholder interests).
203. Dangelo, supra note 100, at 543.
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Courts also should examine closely the negotiations, if any, be-
tween the bidder and target management. If there is any evidence
that target management would set aside its concern for stakeholders
in exchange for a higher acquisition price or side payments for itself,
management's purported fears for nonshareholder interests should
be seen as mere pretence.
The most important evidence probably will be the history of the
firm's treatment of nonshareholder constituencies. A long history of
board concern for the firm's workers tells a more plausible story
than a sudden interest in their welfare. This is particularly relevant
for firms that have previously used threats to nonshareholder con-
stituencies to justify takeover defenses. Not infrequently, an unsuc-
cessful hostile bid will be followed months or years later by another
hostile bid from a new bidder. If management has largely ignored
stakeholder concerns in the interim, it will be hard for them to use
those concerns to justify resisting the new bid.
By carrying its burden of proof under both prongs of this test, the
board of directors demonstrates that it is not disabled by a conflict of
interest. Absent a disabling conflict, courts generally defer to board
decisions. Accordingly, if the board carries its burden, the court
should not inquire into the reasonableness of the board's decision un-
less the plaintiff is otherwise able to rebut the business judgment
rule's presumptions. 204 But if the board fails to carry its burden, the
court should enjoin the proposed corporate action and/or grant other
appropriate relief.
Admittedly, judicial review is not especially well-suited to de-
tecting management misconduct. 205 In addition to the possibility of
capturing management misconduct ex post, however, an effective
proportionality requirement may reduce management's ex ante in-
centives to cheat.2° Dishonest management may find it difficult to
construct a plausible story of nonshareholder injury. Dishonest man-
agement may not be able to locate experts who can or will support
credibly a false nonshareholder injury story; indeed, stakeholders
themselves may decline to support dishonest management's story.
Independent directors may be unwilling to risk the reputational in-
jury of supporting a false story. Finally, the hostile bidder will be ac-
tively seeking to rebut management's story and, perhaps, will be
204. Opponents of nonshareholder constituency statutes commonly object that the
statutes provide no guidance to review the board's allocation of gains and losses be-
tween the various corporate constituencies. See, e.g., Hanks, supra note 98, at 113-14.
This objection, however, misses the point. Provided the board is not disabled by a con-
flict of interest, such standards are not needed. As with all corporate decisions, absent
a disabling conflict, the business judgment rule will preclude review.
205. See Bainbridge, supra note 57, at 291.
206. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 57, at 272-73.
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recruiting stakeholder support. All of these factors should deter
management misconduct and, moreover, give management incentives
to evaluate fairly whether shareholder and stakeholder interests in
fact diverge207
IV. CONCLUSION
Many, perhaps most, corporate law academics oppose non-
207. The description in the text of this Article's proposed model focuses principally
on evaluating a board's response to a hostile tender offer. Nevertheless, the model has
general applicability to the full range of structural decisions, all of which are covered
by nonshareholder constituency statutes. For example, the model can be readily ap-
plied to board decisions that impede an insurgent's efforts to wage a proxy contest.
Under Delaware law, the incumbent board must show a compelling justification for ac-
tions interfering with the shareholder franchise. Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579
A.2d 1115, 1120-22 (Del. Ch. 1990). As Chancellor Allen has observed, however, this
standard rests on the "traditional model of the corporation that sees shareholders as
'owners.'" Id at 1124. He went on the observe that "[i]f the law adopts some other
model of the corporation," as some argue that nonshareholder constituency statutes
do, "shareholder action through the vote might well be seen as constituting a threat to
other corporate constituencies or to a distinctive corporate 'entity.'" Id Non-
shareholder constituency statutes thus arguably permit incumbent boards to impede
proxy contests where necessary to protect nonshareholder interests. At the same time,
however, courts could use the model developed herein to insure that the board is not
acting in its own self-interest.
Similarly, the model can be applied to negotiated acquisitions. Suppose the board of
directors is considering a friendly merger proposal, in which the potential acquirer has
requested a lock-up option. If the board grants the lock-up option, competitive bidding
may be impeded. See Bainbridge, supra note 57, at 287-89 (describing the deterrent ef-
fects of lock-ups). If so, a shareholder or a subsequently emerging competing bidder
may challenge the board's decision to grant the lock-up. Under a nonshareholder con-
stituency statute, the board may try to justify its decision to grant the lock-up by point-
ing to the favored bidder's promises to protect target stakeholders. The model
proposed by this Article could then be used to test the board's decision.
The latter example brings up a question of personal interest. I have argued else-
where that the validity of exclusive merger agreements and lock-ups in negotiated ac-
quisitions should turn on whether they are likely to preclude competitive bidding. Id
at 272-92. I proposed that non-preclusive provisions should be evaluated under tradi-
tional business judgment rule standards, id. at 317-23, but that preclusive provisions
should be upheld only if the target board has fairly auctioned the company before en-
tering into the lock-up arrangement. Id. at 323-32. This proposal could be adopted by
courts even in states that have a nonshareholder constituency statute. To the extent
that the proposal calls on courts to apply a traditional business judgment standard of
review, the statutes have no practical effect, just as they have no practical effect on
evaluation of operational decisions. Nor need the statutes be read as precluding an
auction requirement. Instead, the statutes could be read as merely affecting the
board's decision between two competing bidders. In other words, the board still could
be required to auction the company before agreeing to a lock-up, but under a non-
shareholder constituency statute the board's decision to favor one bidder over another
properly could be influenced by nonshareholder interests. As suggested above, such a
decision thereupon could be tested under the model this Article proposes.
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shareholder constituency statutes, as do many other informed observ-
ers. Their basic objection is that the statutes permit directors to
reallocate wealth from shareholders to stakeholders. 208 As such,
these statutes strike squarely at the heart of traditional corporate law
norms. The shareholder wealth maximization norm was premised on
long-standing rules allocating gains, under which stakeholders are
paid first but shareholders are entitled to whatever is left over after
all stakeholder claims are satisfied. The nonshareholder constitu-
ency statutes thus appear to give stakeholders a second--and unde-
served-bite at the apple.
Ultimately, however, these broad policy issues are beside the point,
or at least the point of this Article. The statutes are on the books in
over half the states and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable
future. Courts urgently need a coherent interpretation of the stat-
utes. But coherence alone is not enough; courts must also be faithful
to the legislative intent behind the statutes. Courts cannot ignore the
statutes, wish them away, or fairly interpret them as. having no
meaning or impact.
Some board of director decisions increase the overall size of the
corporate pie and thus benefit all of their constituents. But almost
all board decisions affect the distribution of the corporate pie, and
thus result in winners and losers. Enabling directors to transfer part
of the pie from shareholders to stakeholders is the stated purpose of
nonshareholder constituency statutes. Courts must be true to that
purpose, but they need not interpret nonshareholder constituency
statutes as allowing directors and managers to reallocate a bigger
piece of the pie to themselves.
As to operational decisions, nonshareholder constituency statutes
pose few problems. Despite the law's rhetorical emphasis on share-
holder interests, the reality is quite different. Directors in fact rou-
tinely consider nonshareholder interests and are not held liable for
doing so. The statutes thus merely bring the law's rhetoric into line
with its reality. As such, in the operational context, the statutes
should not result in significant reallocations of gains from stakehold-
ers to shareholders. Corporate altruism, which gives stakeholders a
bigger slice of pie in the short run, will often redound to the share-
holders' benefit, thereby increasing the size of the pie in the long
run. Moreover, a variety of extra-legal forces continue to constrain
target managers even in the presence of nonshareholder constituency
statutes, which assures that long-term shareholder gains will in fact
208. E.g., Hanks, supra note 97, at 112-13. Some may argue that the statutes allow
directors to correct wealth transfers from stakeholders to shareholders. I am skeptical
that such transfers are a systematic problem. See supra note 154 and accompanying
text. In any case, the statutes are not limited to transfer situations.
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flow from corporate altruism.2 o9
As to structural decisions, however, the statutes pose significant
problems. For directors, structural decisions introduce a temptation
absent in operational decisions. All structural decisions present a se-
rious risk that directors may favor themselves at the expense of both
shareholders and nonshareholder constituents. The nonshareholder
constituency statutes thus threaten to provide a shield for self-inter-
ested behavior by unscrupulous directors. Claiming to act on behalf
of employees or communities, they may be acting to protect their
own perquisites. Wealth transfers are thus highly likely in this con-
text, although they will not necessarily involve reallocations from
shareholders to stakeholders. A far more likely scenario is that
wealth will be transferred from shareholders to managers. The legal
regime proposed by this Article responds to this fundamental prob-
lem by providing incentives for managers to pursue the best interests
of all the corporation's constituents, while enabling courts to detect
those cases in which management fails to do so.
209. This is a point missed by many opponents of nonshareholder constituency stat-
utes. These opponents focus too extensively on the role of legal systems in holding
corporate management accountable, ignoring the far more important role of market
forces in doing so.
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